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THESIS ABSTRACT

This thesis aims at setting forth how J.L. Austin understood the use of the term 'statement.'
trine analyzing the different

Austin put forth a doc-

aspects of an utterance.

these aspects is the type of utterance it is, e.g.,

One of

a statement

rather than a command. Austin called this aspect the illocutionary force of an utterance.
utterance is distinct
the utterance.

The illocutionary

force of an

from the meaning of the words used in making

On Austin's own admission, he neglected any dis-

cussion of the illocutionary

force, or what I will call the claim-

making force of statements.

It is for this reason that the use

of the term 'statement'

in his philosophy needs to be examined.

In Chapter One, I want to present Austin's development of
the illocutionary
the first

force thesis in Howto Do Things with Words. In

part of his book, Austin made a sharp distinction

between

statements and other types of utterances he called performatives, .
e.g., warning, commanding,judging and promising.

The distinction

was based on the fact that performatives, unlike statements, wE:?r.e
.
not the kind of things which can be true or false.
do not describe anything.
acts in themselves.

Instead, they are the performing of

I will discuss in this chapter how Austin

came to reject this distinction
the illocutionary
the utterance,

Performatives

in favor of a distinction

between

force of an utterance and the other aspects of

i.e.,

its locutionary and prelocutionary aspects.

Chapter two presents criticisms
illocutionary

force of an utterance.

that the illocutionary

of the notion of the
These criticisms

argue

force of an utterance is not distinct

the meaning of the sentence used in making the utterance.

from
They

conclude that by unpacking and examining the meaning of the
expressions used we will knowwhat illocutionary

act has been

performed.
Chapter three is a rebuttal to the arguments against
Austin's notion of illocutionary
previous chapter.

force that were presented in the

By presenting various arguments and examples,

I want to show that the criticisms

in Chapter two are mistaken.

The conclusion reached claims that the meaning of the expressions
used in the utterance will not exhaust the utterance's
can knowone independently of the other.

force.

We

The point of these -two

chapters is to offer a background for knowing and underst~nding
the scope and importance of illocutionary

force.

In chapter four, I begin to discuss the claim-making force
of a statement.

The chapter involves a discussion of the key terms

involved in uttering something with a claim-making force.
discuss facts and knowledge of the facts.

I also

This is to show what

should be emphasized and what should not be emphasized in analyzing
the claim-making force of a statement if problems are to be avoided.
The discussion shows how our knowledge at the time of the utterance
is important for knowing that an utterance has a claim-making force.

The last chapter begins by discussing someof the relevant .
elements that are needed in order for an utterance to have a
claim-making force.

I offer various examples as well, to aid in

showingthat things like the speaker's status, circumstances,
knowledge, reasons and evidence play a role in determining whether
an utterance has a claim-makingforce.

To be stating, I must be

making a claim about someactual or putative states of affairs
based on information to which I have access.

For the uttering of

a sentence to be a happy act of stating, I must knowcertain things
about certain states of affairs which I have been in a good
position to know. This leads me and my audience to understand that
my utterance is the makingof a truth-claim.

INTRODUCTION

As a philosopher of language, Austin put forth a doctrine
analyzing the different

aspects of an utterance.

One of these

aspects deals with how the utterance is to be taken, e.g.,

as a

statement as opposed to a command. Austin called this aspect
the illocutionary

force of an utterance.

He is interested

what it is about an utterance that makes it a particular
discourse, i.e.,

promising, commanding,stating,

is to discuss the illocutionary

etc.

in
type of

Mypurpose

force, or what I choose to call

claim-making force, of a statement.

On his own admission, Austin

neglected any discussion of the illocutionary

force of statements . .

I shall explore howAustin wnuld have explicated the illocutionary
force of a statement if he had expanded his own discussion of this
particular

type of force.

Howis it that I may be said to be

stating something? For one thing, I must be making a claim about
some actual or putative state of affairs
knowledge of the facts.

in the world based on my

Also, if I am to be taken as stating some-

thing, then my claim must be recognized as based on adequate information to which I have access.

If this instance of stating some-

thing is to be, to use Austin's words, happy or appropriate,
everything

stating,

must be in order for performing

i.e.,

this

particular

then
act o(

I must knowcertain things ..about certain states of

affairs which I have been in a good position to ascertain.

It is

2

these things that I want to bring out and discuss about a particular
utterance so that I amy determine whether it is the successful use
of the utterance.
I will not be interested
what a statement is.

in defining o~ explaining exactly

Instead, I will concern myself with those

things that need to be appropriate in order for a person to infer
that a certain utterance is being used with a claim-making force.
Although much of Austin's Howto Do Things with ·Words is devoted
to elucidating what he called illocutionary

force, he omitted any

discussion of the force thesis in connection with statements.

I

shall be discussing howAustin would have construed the illocutionary force of a statement.

In Howto Do Things with Words,

Austin showed how statements and other types of speech acts, i.e.,
warning or coll1llandinghave a lot in common. This commonaspect
between statements and self-motives has to do with the illocutionary elements of an utterance.

Austin was interested

in showing

that certain things need to be in order for a warning or a statement to be considered the appropriate - thing to have said.

Austin

believed that those reasons and evidence that make a warning the
correct thing to issue (words are uttered;

warnings are issued, or

given) also make a statement the correct thing to say.

In general,

certain things need to be in order before I -can succeed in making
a statement or issuing a warning.

It is the total speech situation

that must be considered so that we may knowwhat type of act is
being performed. The speech situation will indicate whether an
utterance is being used to issue, or give a warning or whether it

3

is being used to make a statement.
specifically

What I want to do is deal

with those things in a situation from which we may

infer that the utterance is being used with a claim-making force.
If it can be correctly said to be an instance of stating,

then we

can go on to see whether the statement made correspoDds to the
facts truly or falsely.

I am only interested in assessing a

statement as to its force and not as to its truth or falsity.

4

CHAPTER
1

Since I am going to examine what Austin understood the use
of the word 'statement'

to be and what that use entails,

be important to include Austin's attempt to distinguish
tive and constative utterances,

tive -constative

of

of a theory of speech acts to

This is necessary since the performa-

distinction

ultimately fails

for Austin

his further analysis of the use of 'statement'.
leads him to the formulalton of the illocutionary
speech-act theory.

performa-

the reasons for the failure

that attempt, and his introduction
replace that distinction.

it will

due to

This analysis
vs. locutionary

The inclusion of this topic will aid in .

gaining a clear notion of what Austin understood statements, or
the use of the word 'statement' . to be, especially

with regard to

the later theory.
Early in Howto Do Things with Words, Austin introduces
his theory of performative which he distinguishes
calls

'constatives'.

utterances

Constatives are simply those types of

"whose main characteristic

false descriptions

from what he

or reports,

is that they are true or

etc. 111 Constatives represent those

utterances which are used to describe or report something which,
accordingly, can be either true or false.
truth or falsity

Thus, for example, the

of the constative utterance "It is raining outside

now" depends on whether it is raining outside at the momentthe
Christopher Olsen, "Austin's Worries About 'I State That
.•. ", Mind, Vol. 76 (January, 1967); p. 111.

5

utterance is made.
A performative utterance represents
to distinguish

from constatives.

utterance from constatives

something Austin wants

He distinguishes

this type of-

in order to question "an age-old

assumption in philosophy -- the assumption that to say something,
at least in all cases worth considering,

i.e.

all cases considered,

is always and simply to state something112 which could either be
true or false.

He wants to discuss forms of words which are not

used to make statements of fact.
totally

different,

They characterize

something

even though in some cases they may be mistaken

for constatives.
Austin 2 calls this different

•

type of utterance

tive sentence or a performative utterance,

11

a performa-

or, for short,
Ii

'a performative'

"which is "derived, of course, from 'perform',

the usual verb with the noun 'action

1113

Its function "indicates

that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action 114
"or is the part of, the doing of an action 115
. A performative
utterance does not describe or report an action, rather it is the

.

act or action itself.

It is the performing of the action as con-

trasted with constatives

which may report or describe an action.

Because of this feature,

it is not the kind of utterance which can

be true or false as is the case with statements of fa~t,

i.e.,

constatives.

2J.L. Austin~ Howto Do ThiMgs=with Wotds. NewYork: Oxford
University Press,-1965.
3
Ibid., p. 6.

4--

Ibid.,

p. 6.

Ibid.,

p. 5.

5--

· p. 12.

6

There can be examples of saying something "worth considering116which are not simply instances of stating something.
Utterances and sayings such as:
so-and-so,

1

1

'I promise so-and-so',

I bequeath such-and-such

1

,

or

I

'I bet

I do as uttered
I

in a marriage ceremony are examples of performatives.
of these utterances
done.

In none

is the speaker describing something he has

The speaker is in fact doing something in uttering

these

words; his utterances are not about those acts represented by
the above examples; they are those acts.

To say 'I promise' is

not to report an instance of promising, 'I promise' is the act of
promising:

The uttering of the word is, indeed, usually a, or

11

even the, leading incident in the performance of the act. 117 11 I
do11 does not report an instance of marrying someone; it is an
act performed in the course of marrying someone.
Performat ives are neither true nor false,

because they do

not describe or report anyting in the constative sense.
says

11

Austin

I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. 118 Wedo not

say of 'I promise so-and-so' that it was uttered truly or false]y.
One who utters this simply obliges himself to fulfill
intentions.

If we accept someone as serirusly making a promise,

and that individual in turn does not fulfill
which he obliged himself, he still,
. Ibid.,
7--

p. 13 .

Ibid. , p. 8.

8--

Ibid.,

certain

p. 6.

those intentions

to

nonetheless, made a promise.

7

The promise was just made in bad faith or not followed through,
it is not false that he promised.

A promise is not false because

we can and often do hold someone accountable for a promise or bet
that is unfilled.

The veracity of someonemaking a statement no

longer needs to be maintained or disputed, as when the statement
has been shown to misrepresent what is actually the case.
This brings me to my next point about performatives:

what

is it that has to occur for a performative either to take place
or for it to fall through, not to happen?
Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the
circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in
some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly
necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons,
should also perform certain other actions, whether 'physical' or 'mental' actions or even acts of uttering further
words.9
·
To make a promise, I not only have to be serious,
serious,

and be taken as

but I must also perform those actions which will serve to

obligate myself.

But promising is not a description

for even if they do not happen, I still
"in bad faith,

of those actions,

promised, it was just given

or not implemented.1110 That is why, analogously, we

can convict someone of bigamy; the circumstances for marrying someone were not appropriate,

i.e.,

one of the participants

was not

single . . The uttering . of . a performative is one of the necessary
9

lbid.,

p .. 8.

Ibid.,

p. 11.

10

8

circumstances for performing certain acts.
This brings us to the conditions under which Austin felt
that a performative could be taken as being successful or going
wrong. He characterizes

this as the 'happy' or 'unhappy'

functioning of the performative.

The conditions for a 1 happy1

performative are as follows:
(A. l)

There must exist an accepted conventional procedure
having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by
certain persons in certain circumstances, and
further,

(A.2)

the particular persons and circumstances in a given
case must be appropriate for the invocation of the
particular procedure invoked.

( B. l )

The procedure must be executed by all participants
both correctly and

(B.2) completely

(r. l)

Where~ as often, the procedure is designed for use
by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or
for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person
participating in and so invoking the procedure must
in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the
participants must intend so to conduct themselves,
and further,

(r. 2)

must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

11

To violate any of these rules will make a performative utterance =
unhappy. These violations

Aus~in terms ''infelicities."

also show that the mere uttering
sufficient

for it to be happy.

of the performative is not
In considering relevant conditions,

Austin wants to exclude from considerations
11

Ibid.,

pp. 14-15.

These rules

those circumstances

9

that cause utterances to go wrong because they are "used not
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its ·normal use," such as
acting, poems, or jokes, instead of being "understood in ordinary
circumstances. 12
11

The infelicities
of the above rules.

that Austin described represent violations
Thus, "we ~hall call in general those infeli-

cities A.1 - B.2 which are such that the act for the performing of
which, and in performing of which, the verbal formula in question
is designed, is not achieved, by the nameMISFIRES:and on the
other hand we may christen those infelicities

(the

r .1

and r .2

13 Austin's two concepts
types) where the act is achieved ABUSES.
11

of misfires and abuses can be used "to crack the crib of Reality.
or as it may be, of Confusion" for to be "forearmed should be forewarned.1114
During his discussions of infelicities

Austin distinguishes

between explicit performatives and implicit performatives.

Explicit

performatives
(all) begin with or include some highly significant
and unambiguousexpression such as 'I bet,' 'I promise,'
'I bequeath' -- an expression very commonlyused in
namingthe act which, in making such an utterance, I
amperforming -- for example betting, promising,
bequeathing.TS
But it should also . be clear that a
Ibid., p. 22. ·
1rIbid., p. 16.

14--

Ibid., p. 25.
lSIbid., p. 32.

10

performative may be uttered implicitly, i.e., "the utterance
'I order you to go•~16 "Austin employed this distinction
solely to account for an expression's

being a performative

despite the fact that it does not satisfy the grammatical
criterion for performatives. 1117 A performative does not
have to look like one to be one.
Early in his discussion of infelicities,

Austin briefly

mentioned doubts he had about the performative-constative
distinction,
distinction

which he later expanded to show that the original
was not as clear as he originally

began by asking "does the notion of infelicity

thought.

He

apply to utter-

8
ances which are statements? 111
Evidence that the original distinction begins to
blur together for Austin can be seen when he claims
that there is no reason to doubt.that stating something is performing an act ju~t as much as is giving
an order or giving a warning; and we see, on the other
hand, that, when we give an order or a warning or a
piece of advice, there is a question about how this is
related to fact which is not perhaps so very different
from the kind of question that arise when we discuss
how a statement is related to fact." 19
Their soecific domains of interest

are found to be related.

this reasons, I will try to answer, first,

For

what it is about per-

formatives that makes them like statements, and second, what it
16 Ib.d
l • , p • 3•
17 John Beversluis, "I know: An Illocutionary Analysis",
Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9 (Winter, 1971) p.
18
349.
19

Ibid. , p. 20.

J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances," Philosophical Papers.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. p. 251.

11

is about statements that makes them like performatives.

This

should make it clear what it is about both types of utterances
that cause the distinction

to fail.

Austin held that there was one aspect of performatives
which was similar to something found in statements.

This was
how performatives are "related in some way to fact. 1120 Performatives can be judged by considering how they agree or fit

with the facts.

These considerations

seem to imply 11that for a

certain performative utterance to be happy, certain statements
have to be true." 21 This suggests that the performatives going
right or wrong is as much involved with a correspondence to the
facts as statements are in being true or false.

Austin lists

four conditions that need to be true for a performative to be
happy:
(1)

If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy,
then the ~statement that I am apologizing is true.

(2)

If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be
happy, then the · statement that certain conditions
obtain -- those notably in Rules A.l and A.2 -- must
be true.

(3)

If the performative utterance ' I apologize is to
be happy, then the statement that certain other conditions obtain -- those notably in our rule
.l
must be true.

(4)

If performative utterances of at least some kinds are
happy, for example contractual ones, then statements
of the form that I ought or ought not ubsequently
to do some particular thing are true. 22
-

20Ibid., p.251.

2,--

Austin, Howto Do Things with Words. p. 45.
22
Ibid., p. 53.

12

Performatives imply certain things which can either be
true or false,

and this is a characteristic

of statements.

The implications of performatives are comparable to the implications

of statements. · The statement implications Austin

was interested

in were those of entailment, implication and

presumption.

I shall take each one of these separately and

show its similarity

with performative implications.

Entailment had to do with the idea, for example, that
111

All men blush' entails

'some men blush'" and that we

"cannot say 'All men blush but not any men blush"'23

"Here

the truth of a proposition entails the truth of a further proposition or the truth of one is inconsistent with the truth of
another. 1124 To c.ompare this with performatives

Austin said:

'I promise' entails 'I ought'" and that I I
promise but I ought not' is parallel to it is and it is
not:
to say 'I promise' but not to perform that act
is parallel to saying both 'it is' and 'it is not' 2~
Just as the purpose of assertion is defeated by an internal
contradiction •.. , the purpose of a contract is defeated if we
say 'I promise and I ought not.' 1126 The comparison to be made
here is between entailment, as an implication found in statement
making, and the fourth type of condition for happy performatives
described above.
Ibid., p. 47.

24--

Ibid., p. 49.
25
Ibid., p. 51.
26"j~
D 1 • , p. 51.

13

Implication says, according to Austin, that '"the cat is
on the mat' implies that I believe it is" and that we "cannot say
'the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is. 27 An
111

8 If one makes an assertion
"implies a belief. 112

assertion
statinq
it,

or claiming something but holds that he does not believe

then "Clearly it is a case of insincerity.

unhappiness here is, though affecting
same as the unhappiness infecting
intend, do not believe,
out intending,

11
29 Thus, "the

a statement,

exactly the

'I promise' ... when I do not

&c. because to say 'I promise, with-

is parallel

to saying 'it

is the case' without

believing. 1130 This is similar to the third condition for happy
performatives described above.
Finally,

presupposition,

with regard to statements would

say something like '"All Jack's children'

presupposes that Jack

has some children and we "cannot say 'All Jack's children are
bald but Jack has no chi1dren 31 What can be said of a statement
11

•

that is similar to the example quoted?

"It is usual now to say

that it is not false because it is devoid of reference:

refer-

ence is necessary for either truth or falsehood. 1132 To Austin
27
Ibid.,

p. 48.

Ibid.,

p. 49.

Ibid.,
30-Ibid.,
31

p. 50.

28--

29--

p. 50.

Ibid.,

p. 48.

Ibid.,

p. 50.

32--

14

"the utterance is void." 33 Comparing this with performatives
we find something similar to the non-fulfillment
(A. 1 and A.2).
formula:
of things:
void:

conditions

"Here we might have used the 'presuppose'

we might say that the formula 'I do' presupposes lots
if they are not satisfied

the formula i~ unhappy,

it does not succeed in being a contract when the reference

fails ..• any more than the other succeeds in being a statement~3 4
This is all comparable or similar to the second condition for
happy performatives described above.
So far, I have presented Austin's observation that performatives have a lot in commonwith statements.

NowI want to

expound his view that statements can be infected by infelicities,

that were up to now only considered applicable to performa-

tives.

This has to do with showing "that considerations of the
happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements." 35 For if .
someone says 'It is raining outside but I don't believe it; then
his act of stating

is vitiated

and his statement goes wronq just

as the performative 'I promise I will go but I have no intention
of being there'

goes wrong, one is simply uttering

a sentence

that misfires.

Also, knowinqly makinq a statement about something

which does not exist makes as much sense, and goes wrong in the
same way, as contractinq to sell something you do not own. Thus,

33Ibid.,
p. 51.
34-Ibid., p. 51.
35
_Ibid., p. 55.

15

it would seem that we can use the same criteria
constatives and performatives,

i.e.,

to assess both

both in terms of a relation

to the facts and being happy or unhappy. Hence, we could say
something along the following lines:
To take statements first, connected with the utterance
(constative) 'John is runnino' is the statement 'I am
stating that John is running~ and this may depend for
its truth on the happiness of 'John is running', just as
the truth of 'I am gpologizing' depends on the happiness
of 'I apologize'. 3
Likewise, in a performative:

"connected with the performative 'I

warn you that the bull is about to charge' is the fact,

if it is

one, that the bu11 is about to charge. 11 If it is not then the
warning "is open to criticism" not in the ways viewed as 'unhappiness', but, as with a statement, "to say the warning was false,
i.e.,

11

37

unrelated to fact.
The next point of comparison had to do with whether there

"is some grammatical criterion

for distinguishing

utterance 1138 from the constative.
Austin settles
active.

on is the first

The first

that the "'I'

the performative

The gra111maticalcriterion

that

person singular present indicative

person sinqular present indicative active reveals

who is doing the action does thus come essentially

into the picture" and that the "implicit feature of the speechsituation

is made explicit. 1139 It also should be clear that all

performatives are not of this form, i.e.,
36
Ibid.,
37--

p. 55.

Ibid., p. 55.
38Ibid., p. 55.
39Ibid., p. 61.

'Go', 'Guilty!'

etc.

16

Performatives, therefore, "should be reducible, or expandable,
or analysable into a form with a verb in the first person singular
present indicative active. 1140 Thus 'Go' becomes 'I order you to
go' and 'Guilty!' becomes 'I hereby find you guilty'.

This will

make 11explicit both that the utterance is performative, and which
act it is that is being performed.1141
But it is not always possible to reduce a performative to
an explicit form. For this reason he introduces the notion of a
'primary utterance' which is opposed to an 'explicit
An example of the former is

111

performative'.

! shall be there"' while for the

latter it is 11'I promise that I shall be there' 11•42 The point
here is that the answer to the question 'Is that a promise?' may
either be "'Yes, I promise it

111

or "'No, but I do intend to be' 11• 43

There seems, then, to be a certain ambiguity over howthe primary
performative can be taken while explicit formulas make it clear
"the different forces that this utterance might have. 1144 Thus,
there seems to be a type of utterance, 'I shall be there,'

which

is in between being reducible to a performative or being a description of something that is going to be done; i.e.,
used both descriptively and perfonnatively.

it can be

But the 'primary

utterance' could becomean implicit performative, if, for some
reason, the situation in which it is uttered reveals that 'I shall
be there' was meant as a promise.
40Ibid., p. 62.

41I bid. , p • 62 •
42Ib id. , p. 69.
43-

Ibid., p. 69.

44-Ibid.,

p. 73.

17

Austin also introduced what he called, expositive performatives,
performatives which seemedto be descriptive, yet still

performed an

Someof tis examples of these were, I argue (or urge) that
there is no backside to the moon.11145This seems to be both performa-

action.

111

tive and descriptive.
Here the main body of the utterance has generally
or often the straightforward form of a 'statement•, but
there is an explicit performative verb at its head which
shows howthe 'statement' is to be fitted into the context
of conversation, interlocution, dialogue, or in general of
exposition.46
Here we have a combination of performative verbs and statements.
Since a performative is the performance of an action by uttering
something, it is obvious that we could not be performining an act
of arguing without making some kind of statement.
Fromhere one can moveto performatives, such as, 'I approve',
'I apologize' and 'I criticize',
'I forecast', 'I endorse' and 'I
question•. 47 The point of these is that the "explicit performative
verb itself operates, or operates sometimesor in part, as a description, true or false, of feelings, states of mind, etc., 11which
••• where the whole utterance seems
points to the wider phenomenon
11

essentially meant to be true or false despite its performative
characteristics. 1148 They describe as well as perform an action.
Ibid., p. 85.
4~
4~

Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid •• in passim pp~ 79-98.

49-

·

·Ibid., p. 89.
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It is only a short step now to showing the similarity
tween performatives and statements or constatives.

be-

Thus,"'! warn

you that ••• ' or 'I promise to .•. ' does not look so very different
from 'I state that .•• "' and it "makes clear surely that the act
we are performing is an act of stating,
'I warn' or 'I order 111 49

and so functions just like

Whenwe cometo instances of 'I state'

or 'I maintain' then
surely the whole thing is true or false even
though the uttering of it is the performining of the
action of stating or maintaining. So, under the gralll'llatical criterion for distinguishing between performatives
and statements it becomes possible to put stating into
the explicit performative form which is also something
true or false. Therefore, the distinction fails to distinguish between them, and in fact statements can satisfy the requirements of being performatives, yet which
surely are the making of statements, ans surely are
essentially true or false.SO
Statements, thus becomea class of performatives, with the added
feature of also being true or false.
The supposed distinction

between performatives and consta ~

tives utterances has failed on three counts.

First,

it was found

that considerations of the happiness or unhappiness of a performative also apply to constatives;
constative's

truth or falsity

the grammatical criterion
plicit

second, considerations of a
apso apply to performatives.

Thirdly,

of putting all pe~formatives in their ex-

form allows utterances beginning 'I state that ••.

1

which

seem to satisfy the requirements of being performative, yet which

J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances", p. 247.
50

J.L. Austin, Howto Do Things with Words, p. 91.
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are still

statements.

Whatwe need to do for the case of stating, and by
the same token describing and reporting, is to take them
a bit off their pedestal, to realize that they are speechacts, no less than all these other speech-acts that we
have been mentioning and talking about as performative. 51
111

True and 'false'
1

are just general labels for a whole dimension

of different appraisals which have something or other to do with
the relation between what we say and the facts. 52 All we have to
do is "loosen up our ideas of truth and falsity

and we shall see

that statements •.• are not so different after all from pieces of
advice, warnings, verdicts, and so on." 53 This entire discussion,
up to this point, seems to indicate that what needs to be examined
is "the total situation in which the utterance is issued -- the total speech-act -- if we are to see what is involved in making an
utterance.« 54
It would seem, then, that with the collapse of the performative-constative
classificatory

distinction,

Austin needs to look elsewhere for a

scheme of utterances.

This is precisely what he

does in the remainder of Howto Do Things with Words.

"Wewant to

reconsider more generally the senses in which to say something may
be to do something, or in saying something we do something (and
Austin, "Performative Utterances". p. 250.
52
Ibid., p. 251.

53-

Ibid., p. 251.

54-

Austin, Howto Do Things with Words. p. 52.
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also perhaps to consider the ~ different case in which by saying
something we do something). 1155
Austin began this by providingt a more lucid definition of
a key concept. This has to do with the aasic notion of making an
utterance.

He wanted to reveal exactly what is involved whenwe

say anything "in the full sense of 'say ' ".56

Austin offered the

following explanation that to say something is:
{A.a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises
{a phonetic act), and the utterance is a phone;
(A.b) always to perform the act of uttering certin vocables
or words, i.e., noises of certain types belonging to and
as belonging to certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e., conforming to and as conforming to a certain
gra1J111ar,
with a certain intonation, etc. This act we may
call a 'phatic' act, and the utterance which is vocalized
'pheme' (as distinct from the phememeof <l} nguistic theory);
and
{A.c) generally to perform the act of using that phemeor its
constituents with a certain more or less definite 'reference'
{which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we
may call a 'rhetic' act, ag~ the utterance which it is the
act of uttering a 'rheme' .
This description represents what it is for someoneto say something.
Austin says that the "act of 'saying something' in this full normal
sense I call, i.e.,

dub, the performance of a locutionary act, and

the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of
locutions, or of the full units of speech. 1158 Anytimethat we say
something, ordering someone, warning someone, etc., we are, in
addition, performing a locutionary act.

Whenwe perform a phonetic

act which is of a type that belongs to some vocabulary and some
:>Sibid.
ss-,

p. 91.

Ibid.,

p. 92.

5,-Ibid., pp. 92-93.
58Ibid., p. 94.

.,
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grammarwhich in turn is used more or less with some 'sense' and
reference, then we are performing a locutionary act.

In particu-

lar,
'Mean·ing' for Austin principally "attaches to"
the rhetic aet (or to the use of a pheme in a certain
way), and so is meaning in a use; whereas, meaning in
isolation would have to "attach to" the pheme (the
pheme itself, not the phatic act and not to use of the
pheme).59
Also, to perform a rhetic act is to perform a phatic act and to
perform a phatic act is to perform a phonetic act.
verse does not hold.

But the con-

Parrots may mimic words phonetically but

they are not performing a phatic act, and we may repeat sentences
in a phatic act wffthout comprehending its meaning so that we would
not be performing any rhetic act.

This shows what is involved and

what has to be involved in perfroming a locutionary act.
From here Austin movedon to his next classification,

in

fact the one of most importance, both in his book and this thesis.
After the locutionary act is performed, how then is it to be taken?
Howis it clear what we meant to do in issuing the utterance?
we warning, ordering, or stating?

Are

..It may be perfectly clear what

I mean by 'It is going to charge' ••• , but not tlear whether it is
meant as a statement or warning. 60 To answer these questions
11

Austin introduced the notion of the 'illocutionary'
in making the locutionary act.

act performed

To determine what illocutionary

Robert W. Burch, "Cohen, Austin and Meaning", Ratio.
Vol. 15 (June 1973), p. 120.
60

Austin, Howto Do Things with Words. p. 98.

-

•
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act is perfromed we must determine in what way we are using the
locution, i.e.,

whether we are stating,

appointing, acquitting,
An illocutionary

ordering, warning, begging,

promising, apologizing, or answering.
act has to do with howwe want an utterance

that we make to be taken.

Does an utterance have the force of a

warning or a statement? The performance of an act in this sense is
the "performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something" and Austin will "refer to
the doctrine of the different types of function of language here
in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary

61 The
forces'. 11

force of an utterance is to be distinguished from its meaning which
I will discuss further after

I discuss the third kind of act that

can be obtained from the making of an utterance.
The third type of act distinguished by Austin is the 'perlocutionary' act.

A

perlocutionary act is the production of

"certain consequential effects upon the feelings,

thoughts, or

actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons •••
with the design, intention or purpose of producing them. 62
11

Perlocutions have to do with the consequences of an utterance.
distinguishing the illocutionary
distinguish

In

from the perlocutionary "we must

'in saying it I was warning him' from 'by saying it I

convinced him, or surprised him, or got him to stop
What is important now is the illocutionary
tion to the other two acts.

First of all,

1

•

1163

act and its rela-

"to perform an

61

lb1d.,

62--

p. 99.

Ibid., p. 101.

63--

Ibid., p. 109.

-.
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illocutionary

act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act:

that for example, to congratulate is necessarily,

at least in

part, to make certain more or less indescribable movements
with the vocal organs. 64 It is this relation that is important
11

for our purposes, especially in view of the discussion of the
criticisms to be leveled against Austin '. in the next chapter, so
I will only briefly discuss periocutions.

An illocution would

have the form "'In saying XI was doing Y' or 'I did Y'" while
for a perlocution it would be "'By saying X I did Y' or "I was
doing Y'

11

•

65

The illocutionary form can make explicit what is

being done, for example "in saying A••• I was warning." The
"names of illocutionary

acts seem to be pretty close to explicit

performatives, for we can say 'I warn you that' and 'I order you
to' as explicit performatives;

but warning and ordering are

illocutioriary acts. 1166 To describe illocutions we "can use the
performative 'I warn you that' but not 'I convince you that',

and

can use the performative 'I threaten you with' but not 'I intimidate you by';

convincing and intimidatinq are perlocutionary

acts. 1167 What is important is how the verbs relate to the action.
In an illocutionary

act the verb constitutes

the action, while in

a perlocutionary act the verb suggests the outcome of an action,
'I was convinced' or 'I was intimidated'.

i.e.,

64
Ibid., p. 113.
6S-

Ibid., p. 12i.

6667

Ibid., p. 139.
Ibid., p. 139.
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Austin suggested that whenever I 'say' anything "I shall be
performing both locutionary and illocutionary

acts, these two

kinds of acts seem to be the very things which we tried to use. as
a means of distinguishing,

under the names of 'doing' and 'saying'

performatives from constatives. 1168 Austin wanted to discuss this
from the perspective of constatives,

of which he considers "state-

ments' as the typical or paradigm case. 11
69 Considering all that
has been said up to this point, then the making of a statement can
be said to be both the 'doing' and the 'saying' of something!
"Surely to state is every bit as much to perform an illocutionary
act as, say, to warn or to pronounce," for example 11! state that he
did not do it is exactly on a level with I argue that he did not
do it. 1170
Wecan distinguish the illocutionary

force of a statement in

exactly the same way we would a warning. Whenwe do, it reveals
how an utterance is to be taken, specifically

as a statement rather

than a warning. His conclusion here is that there is no conflict
between "our issuing the utterance being the doing of something"
and its "being true or false. 1171 Wehave already examined~the
ways in which a statement ean be appraised in the same way that
performat ives can, as .happy or unhappy, and subject to the same infelicities.

68

This also suggests the ways in which stating can be

Ibid.,

p. 132.

Ibid.,

p. 132.

Ibid.,

p. 133.

Ibid.,

p. 134.

69-

70-

71--
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like other illocutionary acts such as warning or ordering.
In view of all this, what then can be said about the perfonnative-constative

distinction with which we started?

Austin

said that what we have is this:
(a) With the constative utterance, we abstract from the
illocutionary aspects of the speech act and we concentrate on the 1ocut1onary: moreover, we use an
over-stmplified notion of correspondence with the
fact -- over-simplified because essentially it brings
in the illocutionary aspect.
(b) With the performative utterance, we attend as much
possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance,
and abstract from the dimension of correspondence
with facts .72
These important points reveal that in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary act is an abstraction
only: every genuine speech act is both. 1173 This emphasizes the
need to be able to distinguish between illocutions and locutions,
and it also emphasizes that in performing an illocutionary act
we perfonn a locutionary acts which is to be taken in a certain
way. For all utterances Austi~ has discovered the following:

(1) Happiness/unhappiness dimension
(2)

An illocutionary force

(3) Truth/falsehood dimension

(4) A locutionary meaning (sense and reference) 74

All utterances confonn to this, although they may attend to some
aspects more than do others, for example, statements with (3) and

(4).
Ibid., pp. 144-145.

73--

74Ibid., p. 146.
- Ibid., p. 147.
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In the last lecture in Howto Do Things with Words, Austin
mentions several mJrals that he wants to suggest with respect to
the discussion up to that point.

These are:

(A) The total speech act in the total speech situation

is
the only phenomenonwhich••• we are engaged in elucidating.
(B) Stating, describing, etc., are just two names amonga
very great many others for illocutionary acts; they
have no unique position.
(C) In particular, they have no unique position over the
matter of being related to facts in a unique way called
being true or false, ·because truth and falsity are •.•
not names for relations, qualities, or what not, but
for a dimension of assessment •..
( D) ••• the familiar contrast of 'normative' nr 'evaluative'
as opposed to the factual is in need• • ;of elimination.
(E) ••• that the theory of 'meaning' equivalent to 'sense
and reference' will require .••. reformulating in terms
of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary
acts .. _75
Thus, Austin has subsumedthe original distinction
tfves and performatives under the distinction
and illocutionary

acts.

between consta-

between locutionary

This he did by showing their similarities

and then how they represent abstractions of types of actions he
had in mind when he developed his later notion of an illocutionary
act.
The aim in the last two chapters will be to specifically
consider the nature of statements, as the paradigm cases of constatives, with respect to their illocutionary
or less, to fill

force.

in what Austin intentionally

This , is, more

neglected, for he

admits that "I have omitted any direct consideration of the illocutionary force of statements. 117
~
~~Ibid., pp. 147-148.
Ibid., p. 148.
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But before doing this I want to present and examine in the next
two chapters vari ous criticisms directed against Austin's notion
of illocutionary force.

28

CHAPTER
2

In this chapter I will present three different
criticisms

of the Austinian views expressed in the first

These will be the criticisms

chapter.

of P.F. Strawson, John R. Searle and

L. Jonathan Cohen. The Searle and Cohen criticisms
specifically

philosopher's

are leveled

against the locutionary and illocution~ry

acts

performed in an utterance, while the Strawson criticism will be
drawn from another, but related,

aspect of Austin's philosphy.

This will be from the Austin-Strawson debate on truth and will be
included for a number of reasons.

These reasons are:

(1) that

it will help the reader understand what Austin took a statement
to be, something he did not fully do in Howto Do Thinqs with
Words, (2) that it will serve as an introduction and aid in discovering and understanding the concepts being disputed, especially
•with regard to .the Searle and Cohen criticisms

and (3) that it will

reveal what Austin incorporated and changed about his notion of a
statement and utterances as later seen in Howto Do Thinqs with
Words as a result of Strawson's criticisms.

Althouqh the Austin-

Strawson debate deals with how phrases such as 'It is true that -and

1
--

is true' are used, I will deal specifically

with that part

of the debate concerned with statements.
,l\.ustin and Strawson held contrary opinions on how
true'

is used or functions when attached to a sentence.

believed that the addition of

1

--

is true'

I

is
Austin

involves the making

1
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of a statement about a statement.

Austin's thesis was that a

phrase like this is used to assert a conventional relationship
between a statement made in performing an utterance and some
non-linguistic

situation

in the world.

To Austin, ,:the truth

of statements remains stil ·l a matter, as it was with the most
rudimentary languages, of the words being the ones conventionally appointed for situations

of the type of which that referred

belongs. 111 The addition of 'is true'
ing the relation

between the words used in making a statement

and the situation

it is about.

taken as asserting
attached,

is just our way of assert-

i.e.,

A phrase like 'is true'

is to be

something about the statement to which it is

that it correctly

describes some non-linguistic

state of affairs.
Strawson takes the opposite position in how 'is true'
used. To Strawson the addition of 'is true'

is superfluous

is
and

redundant to the rest of the sentence to which it is attached.
To say that ~rt is true that it is raining outside'
more than 'It is raining outside.'
same claim, thatit

is to say no

These two utterances make the

is raining outside.

This means the addition

of the 'It is true that'

does not add or assert anything more

than was already there.

He also maintains that 'true'

nothing to do with words and the world.
the statement was or could be stated.

has

All we are saying is that
What needs to be answered

1

J.L. Austin, "Truth", Truth, ed. George Pitcher (Englewood

Cliffs:

Prentice-Hall,

Inc., 1964) p. 25.
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is both how he arrived at this conclusion and what it means for
Austin's interpretation

of statements.

On Strawson's interpretation,

'true'

will still

be about

a statement, but it will have nothing to do with adding something about the correctness of the words used in the statement.
'That's true' and '--- is true' have a different function.

To

Strawson, 'is true' is predicated of the type of thing that can
or will be uttered.
statement;

It is about "a potential,

a potential,

if not an actual

if not an actual conjecture .... 112

'That's true' does not have to specify anything in particular
about the utterance used in making the statement.

The specific

u'tterance is "not to be identified with a statement(= what is
stated) which is the subject of predication of 'is true' .... 113
It is not to be identified with the words used in making the
statements.

There is no . reason for an analysis of'true'

specify anything about the content of the utterance.
is expressed by, but not identified with, a sentence.
strates

to

A statement
This demon-

in what sense 'is true' can be .about a statement without

adding anything to the content and is

elucidated by offerinq a

'Ramsey-like' analysis of sentences containing 'is true'.
example, "A's statement that Xis eligible,

For

is true" can be

paraphrased "As A stated, Xis eligible. 114 Wehave a reference
2

P.F. Strawson, "A Problem about Truth ... " Truth, ed. George
Pitcher (EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964) p. 73.
3
Ibid.,
4--

p.

75.

Ibid., p. 78.
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to a statement without anything being substantially

added to it.

It is just something that can or could be stated.

Another

is true. 115 Here there

A1.s statement (what A stated)
example is, 11

is nothing known about the content of the made statement.

We can

obtain paraphrases such as 'It is as A says it is' or 'Thinqs
are as A states."

All they do is allude to the fact that something

was stated while adding nothinq to the content of the statement
uttered.
Yet, although Strawson wants to separate a statement from
the sentence uttererl in makinq it, one still
dependence on words and sentences.
is necessarily

has to admit a

To express a statement, one

coITJT1itted
to using words. Howcan one express a

statement without doino so? One cannot.

Although Strawson wants

to exclude any mention of the words used in making a statement
from any consideration

of truth
1

1

it still

has to be maintained

that statements can only be made with words, i.e., ... words do have
to be used.

Strawson believes they just are not important to

knowing truth.

To say 'is true' for Strawson is to affirm the

obtaining of some particular
stated to obtain.
statement,

state of affairs

which we already

This has nothing to do with the making of a

it is instead concerned only with the

fact,

11

matters are as stated. 116 Thus,with regard to truth,
making a statement is quite distinct
and truth applies to the latter
5

Ibid., p. 76.
6-I bi d . , p . 83.

that

the act of

from the statement made,

but not the former.
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Even though Strawson's criticisms
ments cannot be identified

demonstrated that state-

with the words used to make state-

ments, the importance of words cannot be stressed enough. Weuse
words to make statements;

it is the only way we can know them.

Yet, words are also used to make orders, laws, promises, opinions.
But words used to do these things do not have the same import as
words used to make statements;

they are taken differently.

things as commandsare not taken as true or false.
make any claims about the world.

Such

They do not

Weuse words to perform different

types of discourse and it is only as words are used that we can
know a promise as one type and a statement as another type.

To

recognize a statement is to know that some claim is being made
about some state of affairs.

By contrast,

when someone uses words

to make a promise or issue a command,he is not making a claim
about the world, and therefore,
being true or false.

what he says is not capable of

It is because we can knowwhen words are

uttered that a certain type of discourse is the making of a statement that words should be emphasized in the explication

of

statements.
Strawson s claims about truth are not concerned with words
1

as used.

He feels that the "problem of Truth" is not the

"problem of elucidating

the fact-stating

type of discourse. 117

Strawson's problem is based on the notion that usina "different
7 Tb. '
~-,

p. 42.
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sentences ... sentences with different

meanings, we all make the

same statement. 118 His example is that when "you say of Jones
'He is ill,'

I say to Jones 'You are ill,'

ill. 1119 Weare using different

sentences to make the same

statement, namely that Jones is ill.
identified

and Jones says 'I am

But if statements were

with the words used in making them, then we would

have three different
case here.

statements, which Strawson insists

So, of what then are we predicating

' ... is true'?

Strawson identifies

the three different

'true'

when we say

the commonstatement made in

examples as that of which 'true'

by saying that "any significant

is not the

is predicated

predication of 'is true'

is a pre-

0
dication of it of a statement (proposition). 111
I now want to present Austin's position with regard to Strawson's discussion.

It cannot be denied that Austin was concerned

with statements and the words used in making them, but whether he
identified

them remains to be seen.

of 'statement'

Austin felt that any discussion

must include a further discussion of sentences used

to make them, something with which Strawson would disagree.

The

making of a statement involves the uttering of words. Whenwe are
talking about a statement that a person has made, we are referring
to "the words or sentence as used by a certain person on a certain
occasion. 1111 Yet, at the same time, "statements are made, words or
8 Ibid.,

p. 34.

Ibid.,

p. 34.

Ibid.,

p. 71.

g--

10-11

Austin,"Truth" , Truth, p. 20.
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sentences are used" and that further we talk of my statement but
11

2 This implies that Austin did disof the English sentence. 111
tinguish between a statement and a sentence.

A statement is the

result of uttering a sentence.

it becomes later

Specifically,

for Austin the case of it being that
'logical construction•

the statement itself

11

is a

out of the makings of statements. 111
3 A

statement is the product of using certain words on a certain
occasion of utterance.
As has been seen, f-.ustin distinguished between a statement
and a sentence, but they are still

closely related.

In fact,

Austin had come to say that the same rhetic acts, using the same
phemewith a certain sense and reference (as previously defined
in Chapter One) would consist in "the same statement •.. using the
same words. 1114 It must be rememberedthat a 1 pheme1 is a sentence
and to use it with a certain sense and reference (meaning) is a
rhet ic act.

-The same pheme can be used 0n different
11

utterance with a different
different

sense or reference,

rheme just as we can use "different
11

same sense and reference

11

and so be a
phemes... with the

and speak of rhetically
11

occasions of

equivalent acts ...

but not of the same... rhetic acts. 1115 Going back to Strawson's
example of Jones being .=ill,

it is one thing for two people to say

Ibid., p. 20.

13--

Austin, Howto Do Thinqs with Words, (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1962) p. 1 fn.
14

Ibid., p. 97.

,s--

Ibid. , p. 97.
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that 'Jones is ill,

but something entirely different when someone

says 'Jones is ill'

and Jones says of himself that 'I am ill.

What is important is that the first

1

two are the same rhetic act

while the latter

is equivalent but not the same because different

words are used.

These classifications

are based on the phemes em-

ployed, or sentences as used. The two latter examples are, by
definition,

different

The whole situation

rhemes since the words used are not the same.
is based on usinq words with a certain sense

and reference, and to be truly the same rheme involves using the
same words.
It seems that Austin had taken the lead from Strawson and
likewise separated a statement from the sentence used in making
it.

Yet he still

was concerned with the making of a statement,

something Strawson would deny is important in studying truth.
I think that this was in part due to a change of attitude by
Austin during and after the debate with Strawson. He said, "the
traditional

'statement'

its traditional

is an abstractio~,

truth or falsity. 1116 Austin was disagreeing with

Strawson about whether or not 'elucidating
irrelevant

an ideal, and so is

types of discourse'

to discussing truth or statements.

is

It was important to

Austin, as can be seen in Howto no Thinas with Words, yet it remains to be seen "whether Austin can have it botl1 ways, i.e.,
a 'statement'
'linguistic

that

is a 'logical construction'

and at the same time a
product' of the makings of statements. 1117 Austin

Ibid., p. 147 (I owe much of this discussion to my conversa-Uons with my major professor, EdwardH. Pauley).
17
EdwardH. Pauley, The Correspondence Theory of Truth in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy (Ph.D. Boston Univ., 1969)
p. 238 fn.
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wanted to give a little
initially

held.

to Strawson, but he also wanted what he

Strawson had been concerned with showing why a

statement should not be identified

with a sentence.

Austin seems

to accept this, yet he hangs on to the importance of words. Can
he do this?

His debate with Strawson and his ensuing discussion

in Howto Do Things with Words point the way to the further criticisms to be leveled
cally with the latter
chapter, i.e.,

against Austin.

These will deal specifi-

work of Austin's as discussed in the first

does his doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary

acts, especially

in connection with statements, settle

the ques-

tion of whether he can have it both ways? Can he get away with
holding that statements are both logical constructs and linguistic
products?
I now want to consider L. Jonathan Cohen's criticism
tionary and illoctuionary

acts.

of locu-

This has to do with being able to

distinguish both a meaning and a force in an utterance.

Cohen

contended that there are no such things as illocutionary

acts.

What we attributed
attributed

to the illocutionary

force can, in fact, be

to the meaning of the utterance.

He begins by discussing the performative prefix which makes
explicit

the force of an utterance.

By adding this prefix,

'I

warn you that' to the phrase 'The bull is about to charge' I
render it explicit

that the phrase has the force of being a warning.

Whereas, if I added 'I state that'

then the phrase is not a warning,

but intended as making some claim about the world;
about to charqe.

the bull is

Cohen's claim is that the addition of the prefix

does not say as much about how the phrase is to be taken as it

37

does about the meaninq as a whole. Since the performative prefix
involves utterino certain sounds conforming to a specific vocabulary and grammarand havinq a reference and sense, i.e.,
'I',

the

'you', and 'warn', then it also must be a locutionary act.

This implies that the utterance 'I warn you that the bull is
about to charge' is different
because they have different
tionary acts.

from 'The bull is about to charge'
meanings; they are distinct

The prefix is a locutionary act in itself.

locuWith

regard to our example ''if the warning is part of the meaning of
'the explicit

utterance,'

· it is hardly unreasonable to suppose

that the warning is also part of the 'other utterance's'
though inexplicitly
fied or made explicit

meaning,

8 This means that what is being clariso. 111
is the meaning of an utterance with regard

to the circumstances it is uttered in and what it is intending to
do, and not its illocutionary

force.

In makina explicit

the force

of an utterance in Austin's fashion, we are, in fact, dealing with
meaning. It is that what we rendered explicit.

The prefix adds

to the meaning because it has meaning.
"In short, what Austin calls the illocutionary

force of an

utterance is that aspect of its meaning which is either conveyed
by its explicitly

performative prefix,

if it has one, or might

have been so conveyed by the use of such an expression. 1119 The
entire concept of the illocutionary
into the meaning of an utterance.

force, for Cohen, collapsed
If I am in doubt about some

18L. Jonathan Cohen, "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist," "Philosophical Quarterly" Vol. 14 (1964) p. 123.
19

Ibid. , p. 125.
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utterance then, by Cohen's analysis, I should try to understand
more about its meaning.
Cohen's rejection of Austin's doctrine of illocutionary
force hinges on his interpretation

of the word 'meaning.'

Austin was interested in the 'meaning' and force of an utterance.
Cohenmaintains that the -meaning of the expression used does
give the force that the utterance as a whole possesses.

Other

aspects of the utterance contribute to its meaning. "The
difference between a rising and a falling
right to affect the classification

intonation has as much

of individual utterances into

English sentences as has the difference of sound between 'raining'
and 'hailing. 11120 'It is raining' can be meant as a warning on
the basis of the intonation with which it is uttered.

Cohen is

claiming that the difference in intonation effects an utterance
just as much as uttering the word 'raining'

instead of 'hailing.'

·To Cohen this has to do with the meaningof the sentence-type
includinq more then just the meaning of the words used as part of
the utterance of linguistic

elements.

Meaningfor Austin deals with both the sense and reference
of an utterance.

"But the reference of persona 1 pronouns depends

on their context of utterance. 1121 To say 'He lost his case' has
a different meanino when uttered in an airport then when it is
uttered in a court room. For Cohen, this explains why the same
20

Cohen, "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" p. 125.
21

Ibid., p. 126.
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sentence can have different

meanings. All we have to do is

consider the context within which the sentence was uttered to
know its meaning. This means attendino to the contextual considerations that the reference part of the rhetic act is dependent
upon. Cohen is claiming that the circumstances are a necessary
part of the 'meaninq' of the utterance and not something distinct
from 'meaning' called 'force.'
of the utterance.

They help determine the meaning

The context of the utterance is needed in

order to know the reference aspect of the meaninq of the utterance.
Meaning, therefore,

for Cohen, is not just the meaning of the sen-

tence uttered because it also involves all those contextual considerations

which are, in fact,

of the sentence.

a necessary part of the meaning

These considerations

are a part of the meaning

that the utterance has and not something distinct
bearing another label called 'force':

from meaning

how an utterance is to be

taken lies in its meaning.
Cohen's discussion makes the claim that any assessment of an .
utterance's

meaning will have to involve more than merely looking

at the words used.

"To say that particular

ance's meaning are specially

features of an utter-

related to particular

parts of the

utterance is quite compatible with supposing that some external
information is also needed in order to determine the ·actual reference of the utterance." 22 There is no reason why these contextual considerations

should be distinct

from meaning.

Jonathan L. Cohen, "The Non-Existence of Illocutionary
Forces: A Reply to Burch," Ratio, (June 1973) p. 128.
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In criticizing

Austin s concept of illocutionary
1

has argued that it is void of any si gnificance
utterance.

force, Cohen

in explaining an

All we need to do is elucidate the utterance's

meaning

if it is in some way ambiguous. Because meaning is an aspect of
the locutionary act, i.e.,

the

with is the locutionary act.

1

rhetic'

act, then all we are left

We can know that some utterance

is a

statement by looking at its locutionary meaning. Once we know
exactly the

1

sense 1 and 'reference'

used in making our utterance,
something or not.

behind the words or 'pheme1 we

then we can tell whether we are stating

This implies that ~Austin cannot get away from

Strawson's ori ginal claim that Austin's analysis of truth and statement will necessarily

be concerned with words, sentences and their

specific meaning as they are used in uttering
right there in the literal

a statement.

It is all

sentence meaning, whichrmeans using .

certain words in certain contexts and situations.

After all,

we can

only knowwhat dictionary meaning is being used, if it is in doubt,
by looking at these non-1inguistic

thin gs.

Contexts and circumstances

are a very important part of dictionary meanings.
I next want to consider Searle s objection to Austin's
1

distinction

between 1ocutionary and illocutionary

not accept Austin's distinction
acts either.

acts.

Searle does

between locutionary and illocutionary

To this end, Searle says:

In the case of ' illocutionary acts we succeed in doing
what we are tr ying to do by qettin g our audience to recognize
what we are trvinq to do. But the 'effect' on the hearer is
not a belief or response, it consists simply in the hearers'
understanding the utterance of the speaker. It is this
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effect that I have been calling the illocutionary
effect.23
·
The effect that the speaker is trying to bring about is a function
of the expressions used in an utterance on a given occasion.

The

effect can be recognized because it is the type of thing commonly
recognized as being associated with the words used in expressing
some utterance.

We •mean' what we 'say.•

It is what we knowabout

the meaning of words used in someutterance that enables us to grasp
the illocutionary act that is being performed. An illocutionary act
is understood by attending to the serious literal
of the sentence used in making it.
to "contrast 'serious'

sentence meaning

Searle, on the other hand, wants

utterances with play-acting, teaching a

language, reciting poems, practising pronunciation, etc., and.•••
contrast literal'

with metaphorical, sarcastic,

etc. , 1124

With regard to statements Searle said "that there is a close
connection between saying and the constative class of ill~cutionary
acts. 11
25 This was even held by Austin, who distinguished between
constatives and performatives on the basis that the latter were not
the saying of something, of which the former are instances, but the
doing of something. The question that needs to be answer for Searle
is 'Howcan the illocutionary act of stating be discerned by examining
the meaning of the utterance used in putting forward this type of
speech act?'
Searle's use of the term 'meaning' favors the assimilation of
force into it.

He wants"to make it clear that one's meaning

ZJJohn R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: CambridgeUniv. Press,
1969), p. 47.

--

24John R. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary & Illocutionary Acts,"
Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others (London: Oxford
5
Press, 1973) p. 142, fn.
2 I bi Univ.
d. , p • 68•
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Searle's

use of the term 'meani~g• favors the assimilation

of force into it.

He wants "to make it c 1ear that one's meaning

something when one utters

a sentence is more than just randomly

rel~ted to what the sentence means in the languaqe one is
speaking. 1126 There are aspects of meaning which are not concerned
with words and phrases.
An illocutionary
the utterance

One just cannot simply refer and predicate.

act succeeds for Searle when the hearer understands

of the speaker.

which determine the 'force'

It is these other aspects of meaning

of an utterance.

what we say is to perform an illocutionary
example of 'He said "Get out"',

To mean something by
act.

Searle uses Austin's

'He told me to get out.

The former

1

is an example of phatic act while the other is an expression of the
rbetic

act performed.

utterance.
rhetic

the meaning of

The problem is that "the verb phrases in the reports of

acts invariably

me' conveys force,
Illocutionary
uttered.

The rhetic ·act characterizes

contain illocutionary

although very generally,

force is built

It cannot be neutral

is "possible to utter

but it is still

force.

into the meaning of the sentence
as to its force.

a sentence the literal

such as to determine that its serious literal
appropriate

verbs. 1127 'He told

This is because it

meaning of which is
utterance

in an

context will be a performance of that act. 1128 He is

implying that meaninq is more than just a matter of sentence meaning.
He says that:
26

Searle, Speech Acts~ p. 45.
27
John R. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts,"
Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others (London: Oxford
University Press, 1973) p. 147.
28
I b i_d • , p • 153 •
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If one thinks of sentential meanino as a matter of
sense and referenee, tacitly takes -sense and reference
as properties of words and phrases, then one is likely
to neglect those elements of meaning which are not
matters of words and phrases, and it is often precisely
those elements which in virtue of their meaning are
such crucial determinants of meaning.29
Meaning for Searle includes those thinos that determine force.
force of an utterance can, therefore,
the utterance because by definition

The

be found in the meaning of
it determines it.

fastens on to more than words or phrases.

Meaning

Context is also essential

for understanding the meaning of an utterance.
To mean something literally
specify wh~t illocutionary

by saying something will in itself

act is taking place.

We know the illo-

cutionary act being performed by virtue of the knowledge we have of
the utterance's

meaning, i.e.,

by attendino to the context and situa-

tions which help indicate the appropriate meaning of the utterance.
Once this is recognized we can tell what the speaker has intended to
do in speakinq.

What the speaker has to do to perform the illocu-

tionary act of stating
1.
2.
3.
4.

is as follows:

S has evidence .•. for the truth of p. (proposition)
It is not obvious to both Sand H that H knows... p.
S. believes p.
Counts as an undertakinq to the effect that p represents an actual state of affairs.30

To know that the above claim is being made in some utterance
know the meaning of the expressions used.
stand the literal

By being able to under-

meanino of an utterance used in making a claim

about something, I will be able to see that the utterer

29Ibid.,
30rbid.,

is to

p. 154.
p. 66.

has evidence
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which he believes

about some putative state of affairs which

he thinks I need to be informed about.

On€e I recognize that

the meaning of the utterance presupposes this,
recognize it as the illocutionary

I can likewise

act of stating.

That an

utterer is making a statement becomes obvious to the audience
because for them'to know the meaning of the descriptive expressions is to knowunder what objectively ascertainable

conditim1s the statements which contain them are true or false. 1131
If someonerushes up to me and says "Your house is on fire,"

it

is because I recognize the meaning of the expression employed
that I know that he is stating something about some putative state
of affairs

about which he believes I should know.

The criticisms

I have been discussing argue that illocu-

tionary force is not different

from meaning. That these criticisms

pick up on this notion can be seen because Austin held that any
performance of a locutionary act is to perform an il~ocutionary
act at the same time.
"what illocutionary

To knowhow the former is used is to know
act is so performed. 1132 Also, his earlier

debate with Strawson brought out the fact that he held that elucidation of statements should involve a discussion of the words used
in making them. But he still
tences and statements.

wanted to distinguish between sen-

That he held this can be seen in earlier

debates and in his later formulation of speech acts.
views just discussed show is that his particular
3

Ibid.,p.183 ..
32-Austin, Howto Do Things with Words, p. 98.

What the

procedure for
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showing the distinction

does not work, and, in ract, can be shown

to imply the opposite.
Myaim is to show and examine the illocutionary
statements, or what I dub its claim-making force.
quoted (fn
identifiable

force of

As previously

25), Searle claimed that acts of stating are readily
with saying.

I would like to end this chapter with

a specific discussion of this claim. · Can there be clear-cut
cases where utterances are definitely

taken as being only state-

ments or necessarily having a claim-making force?
this is given by Austin himself.

The answer to

Austin frequently used examples

from the law to reveal some aspect of language with which he was
concerned. I believe that it is here that we can find an almost
classic example of what we have been discussing in this chapter.
In a court of law someone is being accused of something, such
as murder or breach of contract.

Whether it can be established

that he is guilty or not guilty of what he is accused will depend
on the introduction of evidence.

Oneway that evidence is intro-

duced is through the testimony of witnesses to the crime (witnesses
do not have to be eye-witnesses, they can be character-witnesses),
or psychological experts testifying
ability,

but they are still

about the defendant's mental

subject to the same conditions to be

outlined for the eye-witnesses).

What they will do is answer

questions about what someonedid or said.
something to the court.

They will be describing

Everything they utter will have the force

of a claim about what someonesaid or did.

It is on the basis of

the testimony that the defendant can be found gui 1ty or innocent.

46-

Everything they say in testifying

is purported not only to be a

statement, but a true statement .

It has to be so to be admissi-

ble as evidence because opinions or hearsay would be thrown out
of court.

All admissible evidence insofar as it consists of

statements is purported to consist of true statements;
thing one testifies

to will be considered as such.

every-

That it is

so considered can be seen in the legal concept of perjury.

This

is in the violation of the oath by which we swear to tell nothing
but the truth.

It is in itself

also a punishable crime. This

should be enough to show that everything we testify

to in a court

of law a~tomatically has the force of a statement.
What is testified
making force.

to is always identified

as having a claim-

The meaning of the expressions used in testifying

in a courtroom situation are always, without qualifition,
entailing the making of true statements.

taken as

Thus, we have a situation

where the meaning of what we say and the il locuti ona.ry act performed
are one and the same. What we say is what is claimed to be true.
Wehave here almost the perfect example of what Cohen and Searle
have been discussing, that in_ the judicial

situation,

meaning and

force are the same.
"It is possible to perform the act without invoking an explicit illocutionary

force-indicating

device where the context and the

utterance make it clear that the essential

condition is satisfied. 1133

The witness in the above example does not have to prefix everything
Searle, Speech Acts, p. 68.
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he says with 'I state ... '

The particular

situation and context in

which he is making his utterance takes care of this function.

Wedo

-

not have to add anything to what is said to reveal or bring out how
the utterance is to be taken.
counts as a statement;
by itself.

to already

it always is taken as obviously a statement

rr state

To say

What the witness testifies

that I saw the defendant leave the scene

of the murder' and 'I saw the defendant leave the scene of the
murder' are to say the same thing in a courtroom situation.
text in which the latter

The con-

utterance is made shows it is meant as a

statement.
This example points in the direction that Cohen and Searle have
been arguing.

An individual does not have to go beyond the

utterance 1 s meaning as said in a particular
cit how an utterance is to be taken.

situation

to make expli-

The courtroom example implied

this, it also implies that one can analyze and examine something
like a statement by looking at the meaning of the words used in certain circumstances.

Although not all situations

and Seale. claim any analysts of an illocutionary
unpacking of the utterance's

meaning.

are so obvious, Cohen
act will call for the

Its force is simply there in

its meaning.
Wehave been examining the notion of illocutionary
being found in the meaning of what we say.

force as

The courtroom example

of 'testimony' entailing 'statements' is almost an ideal example.
Altho_ugh Austin emphasizes studying words in examining statements, he
still

would not be amenable to reducing one to the other, as will be

discussed later.

What needs to be done next is to examine whether

or not illocutionary

acts can be analyzed in terms of what constitutes
11
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undertaking a literal

utterance in terms of (some of) the rules

concerning the elements of the uttered sentence and in terms of
the hearer's recognition of the sentence as subject to those
rules. 1134 Austin as well as others believed that this is not
the case.

This will be discussed next with the aim of trying

to show whether the arguments just discussed hold, all of which
will assist in elucidating Austin's distinction
ments and their claim-making force, i.e.,

between state-

whether or not force

can be found in the meaning of the expressions used.

34

Ibid., p. 48.
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CHAPTER
3

In the previous chapter, I presented some interpretations
of illocutionary
it.

force that differ from Austin's explanation of

These opposing views assert that the force of an utterance

is exhausted by meaning, to to knowthe force of an utterance
all we need to do is examine the meaning of the expressions used
in making it.

This implies that the claim-making force of a state-

ment is disclosed by the meaning of the expressions employed in
making the statement.

What I will do is examine these interpreta-

tions to see whether they represent tenable explanations of the
illocuti.onary force of statements.
tenable because:

I will argue that they are not

(1) they would represent a mistaken view

about the word 'statement';

and (2) their specific interpretations

of Austin's views on illocutionary
discuss why the term 'statement'

force do not hold.

(1) I will

should not be conflated with terms

like 'meaning' and 'sentence' or 'words' (2) deals with what I
consider are the major faults in Cohen and Searle's notion of
illocutionary

force.

What is the relation '·between 'statement'
Is talking about one talking about the other?

and 'sentence'?
After all, if

there is one thing that Austin's discussions suggest, it is that
to say something is to do something. Is 'statement'
identified with the words used to state it?

then to be

I will try to show

that what is asserted or claimed in the act of asserting
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something, i.e.,

of stating something, should be distinguished

from the words used in asserting

it.

What are the reasons for distinquishina

between the

statement I make and the sentence or words I use to state it?
The reasons become apparent when one realizes

that no specific

sentence is necessary to the making of a statement. · Cartwright

points
• • • •. to the f ami1i ar argument which
proceeds from the fact that uttering the words A uttered
is not a sufficient condition for asserting that . It
is pointed out, quite correctly, that by utterina the
words 'Botvinnik uses it' one may, even without indulging
in aberrant usages, assert ever so many things other thari
what A asserted.
From this it is concluded that the
words themselves cannot be identified with any of the
various statements made.1
Two individuals speaking distinct

languaqes may both assert

that it is raining outside, yet it is obvious that what they
uttef will be quite different.
'Isn't

it rainina outside?"

Also, I may use the sentence
as a statement to make someone aware

that it is raining outside, and for the purpose of getting them
to wear a raincoat on leaving.

The same sentence can also be

uttered by me as a question put to someone who suggests we should
go outside for a walk. All of this suggests that what is uttered
is different

from what is asserted.

Wecan use the same sentence

without asserting the same thing, or, indeed, without asserting
anything at all.

If this is the case, then it becowes absurd to

hold that we assert what we utter.
1
R. Cartwright, "Propositions", Analytical Philosoohy, Ed.
R.J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962) p. 89.
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Take the following example used by Cartwright:
the sentence (in English) 'Botvinnik uses it,
utters

a different

1

A utters

and a Russian

sentence but asserts the same thinq:

Consider A a~d the Russian. Whatever plausibility
there is in sayinq that A asserted the words he
uttered derives from the fact he did, after all, utter
them. But even this plausibility,
minimal as it is in
any case, is missing when we consider the Russian;
for, on the assumption that it is A who asserts what
he utters, the Russian asserts A's words only if he
asserts them without uttering them.2
Wehave an absurdity if we maintain in this instance that we
assert what we utter.
same assertion that

If we assert what we utter and I make the
P..

did usino different

words, then I am

asserting certain words without saying them, which is absurd.
One can conclude from this that a statement made by usinq a
given utterance is not identifiable
it.

with the words used to make

To make a statement one has to use words, but one should

not be defined in terms of the other.
I now want to carry the present discussion to the relationship between what is asserted and the meaning of the words used
in asserting

it.

This has to do with a statement being identified

with the meaning of the words used.

Weknow, for instance,

the

dictionary meanings of the various words used in the utterance
'It is raining'.

But these same words can be used on one

occasion to assert something rlifferent from what was asserted on
another, or previous, occasion.
Ibid.,

p. 91.

'It is raining'

can be classroom
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illustration
description
world.

showing correct grammar to an English class or a
of some actual state of affairs

It can be used to do two distinct

happening in the
things even though

the dictionary meanings of the words remain the same. What is
important here is that an elucidation
words will not necessarily
Was asserted.

of the meanings of the

be sufficient

for determining what

If it actuall y were sufficient,

then the two

utterances would automatically be used to assert the same
thing ;in the two above cases, for the dictionary meanings are
the same. Yet, it is quite clear that they are being used
differently,

for one of them is used to describe correct grammar,

while the other is being used to describe some event in the
world that is presently occurrinq.
If one still

wants to argue for an identity

and what is asserted,

between meaning

then we can further argue against it

through the following analysis.

First,

it is clearly possible

for a statement to be asserted on one occasion using words with
certain meanings and also to be asserted using different
with different

meanings.

words

Followina the notion that what we

assert is the meaning of the words used in the ·utterance,
obtain the following consequence.

If one asserts

we can

a statement

which is tied to the meaning of the words which he used at that
time:
Thus it might be suggested that any statement, asserted
on one occasion by utterin g words which there have a
certain meaning, can, on another occasion, be asserted
by uttering v✓0rds"which, on this seconci occasion, have
a different meaning. State ments, it might be said, are
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no more tied to the meaning of sentences than they are
to the sentences themselves. ~rom this it would follow
that if what someone asserts, on some occasion, is the
meaning which the words he utters have on that occasion
of their utterance, then it is possible that he or someone else should, on another occasion, assert that meaning
by uttering words which o~ that occasion of their
utterance, don't have it.
This absurd consequence would have to be admitted if one believes
that what we assert is identified

with the meaning of the words used.

Someonewho holds this view would also have to concede that
what we predicate about assertions

must be predicable of the meanings

of the words that were used as well.

If this is allowed, and I believe

it would have to be, then we again have absurd consequences.

The

meanings of sentences cannot be "affirmed, denied, contradicted,
questioned, ... " nor can they "be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded,
overdrawn, probable, imporbable, plausible,
These are things we say of assertions

true or false .... 114

and not meanings;

it would be

nonsensical to affirm of meaning what is affirmed of assertions.

To

determine something about a sentence or its meaning is not to determine anything about what is asserted,

i.e.,

what statement or ques-

tion was asserted by the use of the utterance.
Strawson, similarly,

pointed out some of the problems that can

arise from relating

statements too closely to the words used in

makinq statements.

This discussion is a result of his earlier

with Austin on the use of the word 'truth'.
of the word 'statement'
Ibid.,

p. 97.

Ibid.,

p. 101.

4--

debate

For Austin, any analysis

will involve an analysis of the words used
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in making the statement.

The only way a statement can be made

and known is through the uttering

of certain words.

argues against the notion that particular

speech episodes are

the proper subject of any analysis of 'truth'
"The statement that pis
for the first

Strawson

or 'statement.'

not an event, though it had to be made

time and made within my knowledge if I am to talk
115 He says that a statement has to be

of its truth or falsity.
made, but it still
that we predicate

is not of the event of making the statement
'true'

or 'false'.

'True' is used to fefer to

the statement that is made in performing some speech-episode;
has nothina to do with the episode itseJf.

it

The word 'statement'

should also be separated from any consideration

of speech-episodes

or acts of statement-making.
Strawson's discussion reinforces
in this chapter about 'statement',

what was previously examined

'meaning' and 'word'.

These

discussions were directed against certain usages of the terms just
mentioned.

I have already stated that Austin did not claim what

Strawson alleges he did.
'statement'

This is because Pustin does not identify

with the making of a statement but with a made state-

ment. This was clear by the time of Howto Do Thinas with Words
where he claimed, as previously quoted, that a sentence is "used
in makinq a statement,
construction'
distinguiihing

and the statement itself

out of the makinas of statements."
between 'statement'

notion was suq0ested in his earlier

is a 'loqical
He is clearly

and speech-episodes.
debate with Strawson.

But this
That

~P.F. Strawson "Truth", Truth,Ed. Georae Pitcher (Engle'tJOod
Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1964) p. 35.
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Austin did distinauish

between them at that time can be seen

when he says a "statement is made and its making is an historic
e vent .... 116 The statement made and the making of it are

distinguished

by Austin.

Before I get to my specific
Searle discussions,
about 'statement'

criticisms

of the Cohen and

I would like to examine what has been said
up to this point.

It should be obvious that

not a great deal has been added to what we know about 'statement'
and how it should be used.
about 'statement'
article

In fact all that has been put forth

is what we cannot say about it.

gave reasons for not identifying

'word' or 'meaninq' or'speech-episode'
be misidentified.

The Cartwriaht

a statement with either
so that statements will not

He coniluded his discussion with the remark

that to •distinguish

them from other thinqs is not by itself

to

provide either means for their detection or rules for distinouishing one of them from another. 117 Cartwriqht has not given any
means for identifying

statements but he has provided examples of

things that should not be identified

with statements.

Even Strawson has not gone any further
'statement'

in showing what

means. Based on the remarks he has already made, it

"seems that Stra1t1sonis drawing a distinction

between statement

objects and statement acts, and then telling

us that although

statement objects are the bearers of truth and falsity

there are

no such things as statement objects. 118 Stra1-1sonhas nothing to
6J.L. Austin, 11
Truth' Truth, Ed. George Pitcher (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964) p. 20.
7
Cartwright, Propositions
p. 103.
8Richard T. Garner, "Utterances and Acts in the Philosophy of J.
L. Austin", Nous, Vol. 2 (Auq. 1968) p. 215. fn.
-1

11

,

11

,
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add to our knowledgeof the word 'statement' other than howwe
should not use ft.

I will .continue in this chapter to indicate

the contexts in which 'statement' should not be used.
I would like to deal first with the explicitly
prefixes that can be attached to an utterance.

performative

According to

Austin, these prefixes are used to express the force of the phrase
that follows it.

Cohenobjected to this notion by saying that for

Austin themeaning of an utterance is confined to the expression
that follows the prefix.

This would give us a convenient;:method

for distinguishing between force and meaning. But Cohendoes not
accept this notion.

Thi~ is bec~use the prefixes 'I state',

'I

protest• ·, 'I warn', or 'I promise', have meaning by themselves and
do not lose their meaning when attached to another phrase.

By

adding a prefix we are adding another meaning to an utterance, and
not simply making its force explicit.

Whatwas understood as the

force of an utterance, as represented by the prefix, is just part
of the meaning of the whole utterance, and is not something distinct
from that meaning.
The problem with this criticism is that a prefix, such as 'I
or I I protest',

. state'

it is to be taken.
like

over how

It is possible to knowthe meaning of a prefix

"wonderwhether 'I protest ••• ' is
being said as a joke, as an insult, or as a protest." 9 Is the
1

I protest',

is liable to the same difficulties

but still

meaning of the prefix so determinate that no questions and doubts
David E. Cooper, "Meaningand Ill ocuti ons", American Phil osophfcal Quarterly, Vol. 9 (Jan. 1972) p. 73.
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as how it is to be taken will arise?

Does 'I protest'

have the

same meaning as a prefix as it does when it stands alone? To
say 'I protest'

"shows but does not describe or state what my act

is. 1110 But to say 'I protest that .•. ' is to make a description
or a statement as to what I am doing in my utterance.
therefore,

a distinction

between using 'I protest'

using it as a prefix to another phrase.

There is,

alone and

'I protest'

does not

always have the same connotation uttered alone as it does when
uttered with another phrase.
does only if 'I protest'

Cohen's argument has the cogency it

has the stability

of the meaning he im-

plies it has, but it clearly does not have this stability.

If this

is the case, there is no reason to think that all doubt will be removed about the meaning of an utterance by adding an explicit

per-

formative, such as, 'I protest.'
Cohen has also "failed to distinguish between those difficulties which have their locus in the sentence uttered and those which
have their locus in the act of uttering the sentence. 1111 This is
the difference between what was uttered and the act of uttering
The former relates

to 'meaning' while the latter

What we fail to understand about an utterance,

relates

it.

to 'force'.

according to Cohen,

is due to not grasping the full meaning of the sentence uttered.
The act-object distinction,
distinction,

which corresponds to the force-meaning

needs to be examined. If this distinction

holds, then

we have another reason for dismissing the above-mentioned view of
Cohen.
lOMats.Furberg, Sa\inq and Meaninq, (NewJersey: Ro1,o1man
and
971) p. 209.
Littlefield~
11Mari1ynFrye, 'Force and Meaning", The Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 70 (May 24, 1973) p. 283.
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Are there different

things that an audience might understand

or misunderstand when a speaker utters something? Is understanding
an utterance just knowing the meaning of the words used in making
the utterance?

Specifically,

does an audience understand the force

of an utterance separately from its meaning?
I can say to a person on his way outside that 'It is raining
outside'

so that he will put on his raincoat before leaving.

It

is obvious that the hearer understood the meaning of the words
uttered as well as knowing that it was meant to warn him about the
weather.

That same person can be sitting

in an English class a

day later just prior to dismissal and see the same words written
on the blackboard and not knowwhether it is a description
warning or an illustation

or a

of correct grammar. But he still

knows

the dictionary meaning of the words. After all, they were the
same words he heard and responded to the day before.
would not say that his ability
ished.

Wecertainly

to use language has suddenly dimin-

In both cases the hearer and reader understood the

dictionary meaning of the sentence used, but in the latter

instance

the reader did not knowwhat act was being performed by the writer
of the sentence.
Just as the type of act may not be knownwhile the sentence's
meaning is known, we may know the type of act perfonned without
knowing the meaning of the sentence used.
'I order you to go to the bank'.

I can say to someone

This utterance makes it obviously

clear what act is being performed, ie.,

and order.

Yet, the

hearer may reply by sayinq 'Are you ordering me to go to the First
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National Bank on the corner or are you ordering me to go to the
river bank?'

He is aware of the type of act being performed by

the sentence, but he is in doubt as to the meaning of the sentence used.

These examples imply that to fully understand an

utterance, we must be able to knowboth what the sentence's
meaning is

and what type of act it is being used to perform.

For someone like Austin, this 'uptake includes both grasping
force and knowingwhat the speaker said. 12

illocutionary

11

Cohen's criticism

has been directed at Austin's distinction

between the force of an utterance and the meaning of an utterance.
Another problem with Cohen's analysis can be found in the way
,meaning' can break down and the way that force may break down.
This will involve a discussion of what Austin termed 'infelicities' .
Failure to perform what Austin called a rhetic act is due
to the speaker failing to speak with a clear mea~ing. This is
a result of using words without a clear 'reference'
clear 'sense.

1

A failure

and/or a

to be clear over whether an utterance

is a warning or a statement is also a breakdown. But orie should
not conclude that this is the only way that an illocutionary
breakdownmay occur.

The way that these other breakdowns may

occur is suggested when it is realized that such acts as corrmands,
promises, statements or requests "are the same acts whether we
call them performatives or illocuationary

acts. 13 The situations
11

12Frye, "Force and Meaning", p. 288 fn.
13
s. Thau, "Illocutionary Breakdowns", Mind, Vol. 80 (April 1971)
p. 272.
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that bring breakdowns in performatives and the situations
bring about breakdownsjn illocutionary

that

force are the same.

Examplesof these breakdowns are:

A man might say, "I warn you it's going to charge",
when it is not going to charge. A speaker might say,
"I apologize for arriving late", when he has not
arrived late. A man might say, "I appoint you President of the Motor Company",when he has no authority
to do so.14
Despite the fact that each of these acts breaks down, it is clear
that each utterance's

'meaning' and 'force'

is apparent.

There

are no rhetic breakdowns and it is adequate to say the first
utterance is a warning. Wehave, therefore,

illocutionary

break-

downswhich are not due to a lack of clarity.
I have already discussed how being clear about the meaning

of the words used in an utterance is different from being clear
about the force of an utterance.

Problems of clarity affect

both, but clearing up one will not necessarily clear up the
other.

The problem of infelicities

range of questions about 'force'

reveals that there is -a·.wnole
that have nothing to do with

clarity of meaning. These breakdowns have nothing to do with
meaning. One will have to look at other contexts and situations,
in addition to those related to meaning, to consider all the
problems and questions that are associated with the force of an
utterance.
A

further problem with Cohen's discussion is over the use

of the terms 'mean' or 'meaning'.
Ibid., p. 272.

They can be very ambiguous

-
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in their usage.

1

~eaninq I can refer to the topic or subject of

Rut sometimes, "roughly, ·, 1 meanin91 refers to the

an utterance.

point of, or the intention

behind, an utterance.

15 This latter

11

use of •meaning' refers to the point ~of an utterance.

We can

clear up this sense of 'meaning' which an utterance may have
without clarifying

anything about the other sense of 'meaning'

that an utterance has.
i.e.,

In saying "he lost his case" I meant,

I intended to say by my utterance,

that he lost his suitcase.

Obviously 'meant' is being used here to clarify
of the words used in the utterance,
and not a legal case.
utterance,

that he lost a suitcase

One can use 'mea~t• again to refer to the

but do somethina quite different,

is to be taken, i.e.,
case

i.e.,

the intended meaning

its intended force.

viz.,

explain how it

In saying "He lost his

I can mean to warn you not to do the same. It is not

11
,

knownwhether we are referring

to a suitcase or a legal case, but

it is knownthat we are warning someone not to repeat the same
mistake.

Likewise, even if we knew what kind of case was being

referred to, there could still
warning, description,
'meaning', i.e.,

be doubt as to whether it is a

or a criticism.

intention,

Thus, to elucidate one's

in the one case is not automatically

to do it in the other.
Austin himself admitted this othe--·use of 'mean' when he
we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary

said

11

'He meant it as an order',

force

&

c. 16 Austin 1.,as aware
11

I::>

Cooper, Meaning and Illocutions
11

16

11
,

p. 74.

Austin, How!Q. Do Thinqs with \fords, p. 100.
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that 'm~aning' could be used to show how an utterance is to be taken
as well as being aware of its use which 'is equivalent to sense and
1

reference. 1117
The point here is that there is a certain ambiguity in the
use of the word 'meaninq' and Austin himself was aware of it.
has two uses in referring
force.

A clarification

to an utterance:

It

dictionary meaning and

of one use does not mean thatthe other

will similarly be clarified.

Nowit is:

surely wiser and less misleading to use 'meaning' in
the narrower sense, and to employ other terms, say
'illocution'
to refer to other aspects of utterances,
even though in ordinary language people do use 'mean
to cover a wider field.18
This is precisely what Austin did, and any attempt to reduce
it back to 'meaning' should include
other sense.

If 'illocutionary

force'

distinguishin9

it from its

is the sense of 'meaning'

that refers to how an utterance should be taken, then nothing is
lost except a convenient way for distinguishing

the two senses.

But Cohen has confused one sense with the other when he states
that the force of an utterance can be found in the meaning of the
words used.

I have argued that this is mistaken, that we can

talk about what we mean by an utterance without clarifying
anythinq about the meanings of words. We do employ a use of
1

meaning which is intended to explain the force an utterance has.
1

Ibid.
,s--

, p. 100.

Cooper, Meaning and Illocutions 11, p. 74.
11

63

Cohen -is only interested

1
in the one sense of the word 1 meaninq
- ,
.

the dictionary sense, not taken in abstraction
of utterance.

but in the context

A concern with just this asoect of 1 meanin91 will

not help in d~scerning all of an utterance's
cause its other aspects are quite distinct

characteristics,
from this one.

beTo

talk of •meaning• as if it had only one sense is misleading.
Clearing up the meaning of words, even by drawing on the context
of utterance,

will not simultaneously reveal an utterance's

focus.

Cohen's notion of meaning is simply too unclear to accomplish this.
Keeping this discussion of 'meaning' in mind, I would like to
turn to an examination of Searle s analysis of illocutionary
1

Searle also incorporates
an utterance.

illocutionary

force.

force into the meaninq of

To sum it up, whenever somebodyutters

a sentence

"and means something by it, he intends to perform some illocutionary act II and·'furthermore,

"whenever someone utters

with the intention of performing some illocutionary

a sentence

act, he means

something... 1119
It is obvious by now that I do not think this is the case.
Wecan be aware of what an utterance means without knowing how it
was intended to be taken by an audience.

Similarly,

we may be

clear about how an utterance is to be taken by an audience without knowing what it meant in the dictionary sense, i.e.,
the context determining that sense.

without

What we do to sharpen the

dictionary meaning of an utterance will not necessarily
Frye, "Force and Meanin'?11, p. 90.

sharpen
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our understanding of its force.

This works the other way around

also, because sharpening the force of an utterance will not
necessarily

clear up any ambiguities over its dictionary meaning.

The example "The boy delivered the speech" can have difficulties
over both its meanina and its force separately.
questions over its

1

Will answering

meaning1 answer questions over its 1 force

and will answering questions over its

1

force

1

1

,

answer questions over

its · 1meaning1 ? \•!henwe ask "1•/hatdid he mean by 1 The boy delivered the speech'?"

we could obtain two different

of which may have nothina to do with each other.

answers, both
We can say the

following of an utterance:
That question demands answers like "He meant that the
messenger brought the speech to the office. 11 And on
the other hand, this specification of what the
speaker meant does not tell us whether the man was
admittina somethinq or claimina somethino... there is
also available the "fuller" description: - "He claimed
that the boy delivered the speech." And this one
leaves completely open the question of what he meant. 20
Both answers describe something different
question.

about the utterance in

There is no reason to believe either one is better for

informing us about the 'meaning' of the utterance.
provides information about the utterance,

Although either

it does not provide all

the information that could be known. One answer can be better
than the other depending on one s interests.
1

The examples just

used reveal how one sense of the meaning of an utterance can be
20

Ibid.,

p. 291.
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knownwithout knowing the other sense.
interpretation

This shows that Searle's

of Austin's theory:

fails because of an equivocation on ~meaning' that we
have already sorted o~t, namely, between 'meaning'
signifyinq an intention of a speaker, using some
meaningful utterance, to mean something ulterior,
and signifying the sense ~f utterances that may or
may not also be so used. 2
11

Austin's distinction

between the locutionary and illocutionary

an attempt to distincguish
_formed in using it.

II

between an 'utterance'

is

and the act per-

I have been discussina how the different

senses of 1 meaninq1 are approprfate to the distinction
'utterance'

and 'act',

the other.

Thus, we can say:

between

and what you say of one can't be said of

The sense of 1 meaninq1 proner to speech acts is the
sense in which "meaning" something is performing a
distinctive act; and the sense of 'meaning' proper
to that which may be used in given speech acts is
the sense in which words, morphemes, and the like
are meaningfully related to each other in the context of sentences normally used to perform speech
acts. 22
This is how the distinction

between meaning and illocutionary

as maintained by Austin, and rejected by Searle, can still
maintained.

In fact,

Searle's

acts

be

thesis which is "a study of the

meanings of sentences is not in principle
of speech acts 1123 is mistaken.

distinct

from a study

The sense of meanino' which is
1

21Joseph Margolis, "~-1eanin q, Speaker's Intentions, and Speech
Acts," Review of Metaphysics. Vol. 26 (June 1973),
p. 689.
22

Ibid., p. 689.
Searle, Speech Acts, p. 18.

23--
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applicable to speech acts, and which Austin called illocutionary
force, is not the same as the sense of meaning concerned with
1

the dictionary meanings of sentences.
is a study of the other is mistaken.

1

To say that a study of one
Wecan exhaust a sentence's

meaning by looking at the context of its utterance without
exhausting what 'force'

it is meant to have (example, p. 15).

This discussion, up to this point, should be sufficient

to

reject the criticisms of philosophers such as Cohen and Searle,
who would hold that' the dictionary meaning of a sentence used in
an utterance can adequately explicate any questions that I may
have about the force of the utterance.
1

act

1

aspect of an utterance.

. constative distinction
the latter

They have neglected the

Austin abandoned the performative-

(the former is the performing of an action,

is the saying of something) in favor of the notion to

say something is always to perform some act.

One of these acts

is called illocutionary

from locutionary

acts and are distinct

acts, the saying of something. This chapter has argued that this
distinction
other.

is able to endure attempts to assimilate one with the

Acts, such as betting, warning, stating and promising are

not discerned by examining the dictionary meaning of the sentence
used in what was said.

The type of act performed does not depend

on the dictionary meaning of the utterance used.

Early in Howto

Do Things with Words, Austin held that constatives were the
saying of something and were not in themselves an act.

But even

constatives became performative acts with both groups becoming
distinctions

within the class of illccutionary

acts.

The particular
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act performed determines the 'force'
The utterance's

that an utterance will have.

dictionary meaning will not fix the force it will

have. The remaining chapters will discuss the claim-making force
that an utterance can have when the illocutionary

act of stating

is performed. The analysis to follow will present not only what
claim-making force should be identified with, but also what it
should not be identified with if confusions are not to arise.
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CHAPTE
R 4

Underlying the last few chapters has been a discussion and
examination of Austin's locutionary and illocutionary
tion.

act distinc-

I want nowto focus on the notion of force as part of the

total speech act independently of any concern about whether it is
part of, or, as I believe, from, the dictionary m~aningof the
sentence uttered.

Austin's critics

have not eliminated the notion

of force so much as they have subsumedit under another notion.
They have simply increased the burden that the term 'meaning' must
carry.
Before beginning an examination of the notion of the force of
an utterance, I would like to do some stage setting.

In the process,

I hope to reveal the general scheme into which 'claim-making' fits.
Howhas the term 'force' been generally used? As previously
seen, force has to do with how·an utterance is to be taken.
what was uttered a question, colTIT!and;statement, etc.?

Is

This

question is possible because one and the same sentence can be used
to express a commandat one momentand a statement at another.
The sentence, i.e.,

the actual words, need not vary.

The force of

an utterance derives from what we do in the course of saying something, i.e.,

the speech act we perform. For Austin, this means

"that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the
words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context'
in which they are designed to be or have actually been spoken in

69

a linguistic

interchange. 111 The context, _or situation,

help explain what illocutionary
utterance was emitted.

act was performed when the

Thus, if the same sentence is · being used

on separate occasions to do different
is attributable
context.

will

things, then the difference

to something other than the sentence, viz., to the

The context includes what else was said on that

oceasion, the speaker's status,

and the other circumstances in-

volved in uttering it.
Howsomething that was said is meant to be taken can be
understood by attending to the circumstances surrounding the
occasion of its utterance.

It is these things that change from

one occasion of uttering a sentence to another occasion of uttering
the same sentence and, explain why on one occasion it is meant as
a question and, on another, as a statement.

Force is, therefore,

connected to the occasion and context of an utterance.

Knowingthe

dictionary meaning of the words used does not explain whether the
utterance is used to ask a question or make a statement.
The analysis of the illocutionary

force of an utterance must

go beyond the dictionary meaning of the words used because the
characteristics

of truth, falsity

a given utterance.

arid infelicities

may all belong to

Wemust consider the tot~l speech situation

determining how an utterance is to be taken:
That you did warn and had the right to warn,
did state, or did advise, you were right to
state or warn or advise, can arise--not in
the sense of whether it was opportune or

Austin, Howto do Thinqs with Words, p. 100.

in
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expedient, but whether, on the facts and your
knowledge of the facts and purposes for which
you were speaking, and so on, this was the
proper thing to say.2
For this reaso~, Austin combined constatives and performatives together as illocutionary

acts.

The way performatives are assessed

and the way constatives are assessed are assimilated in assessing
the total speech act.

About the constative~performative and the

locutionary-illocutionary

distinctions

we can say:

The thought of the purely constative, as that
which is .just and simply true or false, is
really, he seems to suggest, the result of
concentrating on the locutionary aspect of
some speech acts, on their meaning (sense and
reference), to the neglect of their i11ocutionary aspects; the thought of the purely
performative, as that which has nothing of
truth or falsity about it, is the result of
concentrating on the illocutionary aspect of
some speech acts neglecting the 'dimension
of correspondence with facts. 3
1

This is howAustin arrived at his doctrine of performative and constative utterances.

This change paves the way for a discussion of

the illocutionary force of an utterance,
statement.

including the force of a

For the moment, I shall concentrate on the illocu-

tionary aspect of a statement and ignore the question of its
truth and falsity.

This is what I intend, but one may wonder how

I can study the claim-making force of statements whose very nature

is to be true and false and at the same time ignore this crucial
aspect.
2

Before going any further,

I would like to discuss this point.

Ibid. , p . 144.

3--

P.F. Strawson, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning"', Essays on
J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others, p. 53.
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Myconcern with claim-makinq force is not an interest
what statement is asserted in an utterance.
terested

in

Rather, I am in-

in what it is about an utterance that makes it a state-

ment, and gives it claim-making force.
difference between the act of stating

It is a matter of the
something and the state-

ment that is made. It is not the making of a statement which is
true or false,

but what is stated that is true or false.

That

an utterance has a claim-making force is due to certain

intentions,

contexts,

Strawson s

situations,

etc.,

as well as forms of words.

1

statement quoted in the previous paragraph implies that it is the
locutionar_y aspect of the utterance that will inform us as to
what is true or false,
tells

but it is the illocutionary

aspect which

us whether it is the kind of thing which can be true or false.

It is this latter

aspect that I want to explore.

That something is

tr-ue or false will depend on whether or not the statement made fits
with, or corresponds to, the state of affairs
be the case.

which is claimed to

If we are to say that it is the act of stating which

is true or false,

then we are left with the absurd consequences

Strawson pointed out in his 1950 debate with Austin as mentioned
in Chapter Two.

But we have already pointed out in that chapter

that Austin did distinguish

between the statement made and the

act of statement-making.
In examining the claim-making force of a statement,

I want

to deal with three examples of utterances used to make statements.
The first

example is where the statement is made explicit

a performative device;

through

the second is where the utterance lacks
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this specific device but is still

called a statement;

and the

third is the utterance which does not have the commoncharacteristics

usually associated with a form of words used to make a

statement.

Illustrations

cribed would be:
and 'Isn't
statements.
illustrations

of these types of utterance just des-

~I state that it is raining,'

it raining?'

'It is raining'

all of which could be said to express

Although I do not believe that the first

and third

are as commonas the second, they are still

possi-

ble, and their unusual character will aid in examining the notion
of claim-making force.

If they are possible, then it is their

claim-making force which accounts for their all being considered
statements.
What are the conditions that any speech act must fulfill
it to constitute

a certain speech act?

for

Speech acts imply certain

things:
This is the use of 'imply' I shall be concerned
with: the use in which the performance of a
certain deed (including a speech act) gives the
audience a right to infer something about the
performer's beliefs.
The right is given not by
the speaker but by the action aad its occurrence
in a certain type of situation.
If this were not the case, we would cease to listen and respond
to a speaker's utterance.

These requir.ements are even necessary

to insincere utterances such as lies,

because if the audience did

not believe that the liar had the beliefs and attitudes
particular

speech situation

which the

calls for, then his lie would not be

Mats Furberg, Sayinq and Meaninq, p. 95.
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convincing.

Every utterance a speaker emits must fulfill

conditions if it is to be taken seriously.
utterance,

there will .be certain

that particular

speech act.

these

In any serious

implications associated with

It is through these implications

that we can determine whether the particular

speech act performed

is the appropriate one or not.
An examination of these implications
the illocutionary

is an examination of

dimen~ion of an utterance;

This dimension,

in the case of statement making, consists of uttering words in
circumstances that satisfy

the felicity-conditions

of stating.

What is it about an utterance that makes us take it as claiming
something to be true or false when in other circumstances the same
words could be used and not be taken as the making of a statement?
To take my first
cedes 'it

is raining'

illustration,

the 'I state that'

which pre-

is prefixed to reveal how the speaker wants

his utterance to be taken, in this case, as making a claim about the
world:

"'I state that'

is often a signal that the speaker is firmly

determined to defend a certain utterance,

be it a constative,

a

value-judgement, or whatnot. 115 This commentsuggests that the phrase
'I state that'

may be used to indicate something other than a claim

about the world.
claim.

But I am only interested

'I state that it is raining'

audience should take my utterance.

in its use in making a

renders explicit
In this instance,

how an
I am telling

you that my utterance is the type of thing which is true or false.
the difference

It's
5

Ibid.,

p. 228.

between making a claim and informing you that
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what I am doing is making a claim.

Uttering 'I state that'

is

doing the latter.
Before we can assess something as true or false,

we may

sometimes have to indicate that it is the type of thing that
can be true or false.

To assess it as true or false,

it corresponds to some actual state of affairs.

we see how

To assess it as

a claim is to assess whether or not it is the appropriate thing
to be saying on this occasion and under these circumstances:

11
The

sense which does concern us is its illocutionary

per-

formative) sense.

116

(or explicit

It will be those things that are associated

with performatives and their felicity

conditions that will indicate

whether or not what I am doing is the type of thing that should be
taken as a statement.
WhenI say, 'I state that it is raining,'
bility

for the fulfillment

of cettain

conditions.

I assume: responsiFor example,

I must be in the position of possessing adequate information about
the current weather situation.

To be in this position,

I must have

just come in from outside, be looking out a window, or have been
informed by someonewho was just outside.

If my audience cannot

assume one of these conditions to be the case, then they will accuse
me of simply hazarding a guess. These conditions must obtain for a
claim-making utterance to be in order, just as an army officer must .
have the status of being in authority to give orders which others
are expected to obey. A person has to be in the right position to
Christopher Olsen, "Austin Worries A.bout I State that ... ,"
Mind, Vol. 76 (January, 1967) 1, p. 113.
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make a statement.

If he is not in the right position to make a

statement there is no reason to think that what he utters
used to make a statement.

is being

To know that an act of uttering

some-

thing is making a claim will depend, in part, on whether it is
justified

by the utterers'

position.

If it is not so justified,

the most one can say is that such an act is an attempt

(albeit

unsuccessful) to make a claim.
That an utterance should be taken as having a claim-making
force, may depend on certain things being said or done by the
speaker as well as by his audience.

Austin says that "if I have

stated something, then that commits me to other statements:

other

statements made by me will be in order or out of order. 117 This
not only refers to other statements that I make but to statements
that other individuals make. If I make plans to go on a picnic
immediately after stating that it is raining,
to believe that what I first
statement of fact.
self.

then there is reason

said was not seriously

intended as a

I have by my actions seemingly contradicted my-

Whenwe make a statement, we are implying that we believe

that what is stated is actually the case.

WhenI believe the

statement that I make, then anything else said in connection with
my statement must be in line with it.

Whenan utterance is made,

its claim-making force will be appropriate
things are true.
obtain.

if certain other related

Its force will be happy only if certain conditions

If these other conditions,

e.g.,

felicities

r.1

and r.2

(as seen in Chapter One), do not obtain, then we may conclude that
7
Austin, Howto Do Things with Words, p. 138.
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the 'I state that •.• ' was not the appropriate thing to say.
circumstances simply were not the ones that would justify
claim-making force made explicit

The

the

in the utterance.

But why wouldn't we say that the utterance is false instead of
inappropriate?

This question represents the distinction

between

saying that the statement is true or false and that it is something which constitutes

the making of a claim.

In the latter

"case of a putative statement presupposing ... the existence of that
which it refers;

if no such thing exists,

'the statement'

is not

about anything" ... "it is better to say that the putative statement
is null and void .... 118 The circumstances must allow for the
utterance to have a claim-making force;

if they do not, the utter-

ance is not the appropriate one for the situation.

The claim-

making force is not found because the putative statement is unhappily
made.
What about 'It is raining'?

What gives this a claim-making

force rather than the force of a warning? Wecould assess it the
same way as the explicit

version -because ..,.,emay-make explicit

what

11

we were doing" for example, "to say 'I state that he did not' is to
make the very same statement as to say 'he did not.'

9 Wesimply

11
•

look at those circumstances in which the utterance is made to see
whether or not it can be said to have a claim-making force.
we look at the

11

That is,

ceremonial non-verbal procedures ; the circumstances

of the utterance and the speaker's status ... 1110 The audience
~Ibid., p. 136.
115Tcf., p. 134.
10
Furberg, Sayinq and r.1eaninq, p. 211.
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would have to infer from all these evidences that the utterance
does or does not have the force of making a claim.

In this in-

stance, the speaker believes that certain circumstances are the
case, for example, that the streets

are wet, I take my umbrella,

you take your umbrella, I have cancelled my outdoor activities,
you have cancelled your outdoor activities,
'It is raining'

etc.

can also be a -warning and made explicit

the addition of the prefix 'I warn.'
happy, then it must be true

by

But if this act is to be

that it is raining.

This means that

the statement that it is raining must be true in order for the warning to be the correct thing to give under the circumstances.
if I utter

'It is raining'

as a statement,

you even without my intending it to.

Also,

it might serve to warn

Because I made the statement,

you then had information, and were forewarned as to whether to take ·;
an umbrella or not.

The point here is that an utterance may have

the force both of being a warning and a claim.

The situations

and

circumstances which need to obtain if the utterance can be said to
have a claim-making force can be found in other types of utterances,
just as other types of force can be implied when a statement is made.
It is for this reason that an utterance like 'Isn't
raining?'

it

may well be a statement and can be taken to emphasize

how hard it is raining and be equivalent to 'It is raining (hard),
isn't

it?"

WhenI utter this to someone immediately after coming in

from the outside and after cancelling my outdoor activities,

the

utterance might very well have the force of a statement although the
words are uttered i n the .-form of a question.

If these things are the

case, then the utterance may be appropriately

said to have a claim-
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making force.

In fact, many types of discourse have the force they

are said to have only because a true statement is implied.

'I warn

you that the bull is about to charge' can fail as a warning unless
the statement 'the bull is about to charge' is true.

Since a state-

ment is implied by these other types of acts, why couldn't the implied statement become the object of our interest?
terrogative
"Isn't

illocutionary

it raining?'

force-indicating

Despite th~ in-

devices contained in

the context in which it is uttered may suggest

that a statement is actually being made. In this example, the context of the utterance is obviously very important for it to be taken
as a statement.

· If various types of speech acts imply a statement

or the truth of a statement, then why couldn't something that sounds
like a question be taken as a statement, especially

if the context

in which it is uttered indicates some claim is being made? Whywould
someone ask this as a mere question if, for instance,
in 'from outside?'

It seems more likely,

he just came

under the circumstances,

that he is making a statement.
This suggests that many types of discourse and not just statements, are dependent on a relationship

with the facts.

As previously

quoted, in this chapter (footnote 2) Austin believed "the question
of whether ... you were right to state or warn or advise, can arise ...
on the facts and your knowledge of the facts.''

I think it is safe to

agree with Strawson on the following:
The facts of the case may be such as to
make a request a reasonable request, an
order a sound or justifiable order, a
piece of advice good advice; or they
may be such that the request is unreasonable,
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the order unsound, the advice bad. 11
A relationship

with the facts is important not only for determining

the truth or falsity
like requests,

of statements but also whether or not things

commands,promises, warnings, statements,

warranted or not.

The facts make these illocutionary

appropriate acts to perform.

are

acts the .

It is because of this that things like

commandsand promises have a descriptive
pect.

etc.,

as well as performative as-

Austin had come to believe that characteristics

of constatives

also apply to performatives and that characteristically

performatives

apply to constatives.

A relationshi~

to the facts,

then represents

one general dimension for assessing all types of discourse.

Howis

it that the facts decide that a commandor promise is appropriate?
It is because the different
some statements are true.
statements,

requests,

etc.,

types of discourse are warranted only if
All types of discourse,

are appropriate only if the facts indicate

that they were the appropriate things to say.

Certain statements im-

plied by these acts must be borne out of the facts,
least,

commands,promises,

or, at the very

must be believed to be so borne out.

1I

P.F. Strawson, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'", Essays
on J.L. Austin, ed. Berlin and others (Lon~0n: Oxford
University Press, 1973) p. 65.
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Further Remarks
For an utterance to have or imply a claim-making force is to
say that it was appropriate for the speaker to make some claim or
imply a claim about the world, which may or may not fit the facts.
The business of statements,
state of affairs.

for Austin, was to describe some actual

But the making of a statement also implies a

whole range of facts that need to obtain before we can call what we
are uttering

a statement, or an utterance can be correctly

said to

have a claim-making force.
I believe that if one is not clear about how Austin understood
the word 'statement',
and mistaken doctrine.

then one could be left with a very confused
I say this because it has been suggested

that if we can determine that a statement was the appropriate utterance to make then we also know that it is a true statement.
Establishing

the claim-making force of an utterance presupposes, on

this view, the truth of the statement that is made. ·rt is no · wonder
that it was the appropriate utterance to make! Take, for example,
the utterance

11

I warn you that the bull is about to charge. 1112 How

do we know that this was the appropriate thing to utter?
be a happy act of warning? Austin said

Howcan this

that for a certain performa-

11

tive utterance to be happy, certain statements would have to be
true. 1113 For a warning to be the appropriate act for the
circumstances in which it is uttered,

it will need to be happy and

•
12

Austin, Howto Do Thinqs with Words. p. 55.

13

Ibid.,

p. 45.
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to be happy or unhappy it must be "true or false that it is going
to charge;

and that comes in in appraising the warning .... 1114 It

will be ~- happy act of warning if it is true that the bull is about
to charge and an unhappy act of warning if it is false that the
bull is about to charge.
Nowconsider the utterance
C. Olsen's interpretation

'I state that p'.

of Austin we investigate

(or unhappiness) of (this)

According to
"the

happiness

locution,

and its happiness will depend
to a great extent ... on the truth of 'p. 11115 This means that any
happy occurrence of 'I state that p' "does not seem capable of being
true or false in any significant
guarantees the truth

II

sense, because the 'I state that'
of the entire utterance. 1116 'I state that p'

does not seem capable of lending itself
dimension.

As criticisms,

Olsen's comments are important because

Austin believed that we investigate

the truth of 'I state that p' in

the same manner that we would investigate
1

p1 •

to the truth/falsehood

the truth of the statement

Olsen said that for 'I state that p' we "investigate ... the

happiness (or unhappiness) of the locution'' while 'p' is"meant
first .and foremost to be liable to assessment in what Austin (called)
the "truth/falsehood dimension." . · 17
In evaluating Olsen'.s comments, I can only conclude that he is
mistaken.
falsity

At the time of Howto Do Thinqs with Words, truth and

had become for Austin just one way in which ''the words

Ibid., p. 135.
15olsen, "Austin Worries About 'I state that ... "', p. 113.
16
Ibid., p. 112.

,.,--

Ibid.,

p. 113.
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stand in respect of satisfactoriness
tions,

etc.,

to the facts,

events, situa-

to which they refer. 1118 An utterance can be· related to

the facts by more than the truth/falsehood
statements included.

Truth and falsity

assessing a particular

utterance.

dimension of assessment,

are only one dimension for

Truth and falsity

"have no unique

position over the matter of being related to the facts in a unique
way... 1119 Austin wanted to go beyond assessing an utterance on the
basis of only being true or false to the 11general dimension of
being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing,
in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and
with these intentions. 1120
Austin treated statements as he did other performatives;

for

an utterance to be a happy case of warning, it must be true that
someone is in danger and that this is being successfully
to his attention
Similarly,

by words the potential

victim will recognize.

for a statement to be happy, it will,

that must go right,

brought

have to fit the facts truly.

amongother things
This is because

it is the right thing to utter with regard to the facts.
some reason it is not and is therefore false,

If for

then according to

the above quote it was the wrong or improper utterance to have
made for the situation

and circumstances,

a determination that

often cannot be made in advance but only after checking.
8

Austin, Howto Do Things with Words, p. 148.
19

I b i d . , p . 148.

20--

I bid. , p. 144.
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Statements, for Austin, were just one type of utterance,

but

he believed that they could be assessed in the same manner as other
types of utterance.

Austin asked, "Can we be sure that stating

truly is a different

class of assessment for arguing soundly, ad-

vising well, judging fairly,

and blaming justifiably?

evidence by which we judge the appropriateness
not very different
priateness

of a statement is

from the evidence by which we judge the appro-

of a warning or a piece of advice.

same role in assessing acts of stating
of warning.

1121 The

The facts play the

as they do in assessing acts

The same things determine if a statement and a warning

were successful or unsuccessful.
illocutionary

The success or failure

of ~any

act is dependent on the same type of assessment.

The Olsen article

uses an analysis where 'I state that p' is

compared with 'I warn you that p'.
'p' must be at least true.

For both utterances

to be happy

Olsen claims that if this is the case,

then in all instances where it is proper to say 'I state that p'
there can be no doubt as to the truth of the statement.
blem with this is that Olsen fails

The pro-

to carry his comparison far

enough in attempting to drive a wedge between 'I state that p' and
the statement 'p'.

Remember, Austin belie vr.cf th at we should investi-

gate the happiness of 'I state that p' in the same way as we would
for

1

p

1

•

Olsen claims that the former implies the truth of 'p',

and that the truth of 'p' is a condition for the happiness of 'I
state that p. '
Olsen can .be . ~een · to mi~s the point
I b i d • , p • 144 •

if we look at what
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Austin called a more general dimension of assessing utterances,
i.e.,

when we judge whether something is the appropriate thing

to say, and not just whether it is true or false.
is

1

We should ask,

I state that p 1 appropriate for the same situation

cumstances that pis

appropriate?

For example, is

the bull is about to charge' as appropriate as
to charge ? What Olsen fails
1

to realize

1

1

and cir-

I state that

The bull is about

is that the former merely

presupposes the truth of ' ... the bull is about to charge' in the
sense that if the whole utterance was the appropriate utterance to
make, then it is presupposed that ' ... the bull is about to charge
must be true.

1

Olsen's comparison does not go far enough because

he does not treat

'The bull is about to charge' as an utterance

which may or may not be happy for the circumstances in whjch it is
uttered.

If he had, he would have seen that the circumstances

surrounding each should be investigated
determine ,.their appropriateness.

similarly

in order to

Olsen applied the appropriateness

assessment only to 'I state that p'.

Since Austin meant this as a

general dimension for all utterances,

Olsen is mistaken.

If we can assess an utterance as being happy or the appropriate thing to have uttered,

then, to use Olsen' s v;or ds, nthe

utterance as a whole does not lend itself

to true/false

assess~ -

ment.1122 The reason that Olsen is mistaken is due to the fact
that it is because we are able to assess a statement as either true
or false that we can judge that it was happily or unhappily uttered.
The truth/falsehood

a

-

dimension is just one way that we can assess

Olsen, "Austin v!orries About 'I state that ... "', p. 113.
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the appropriateness

of an utterance.

of 'p' is not to determine that

1

To presuppose the truth

p 1 is true, but only to judge

that 'p' is true.
One way that Austin's use of the term 'statement'

could

be said to prejudge the question of the truth of what is stated
would be if those facts,

situations

and circumstances that make

an utterance an instance of stating are confused with those
facts,

sifoations

and circumstances that make it true.

If this

were the case, then Austin's notion of making a statement would
entail

an infallibility

requirement.

After all, Austin says

"on the facts and your knowledae of the facts {that) this was
the proper thing to say. 1123 Perhaps Austin may have suggested
too close a relation

to facts as a condition for knowing that

a statement was the proper utterance to make, but I do not think
this was his intention.
Take the status of the speaker and his relation
facts.

to the

Austin said one's utterances can have the force of

making a claim when the speaker is in a position to know the
facts his statement is about.

He said, "You cannot state how

many people there are in the next room; if you say 'There are
fifty

people in the next room', I can only regard you as

guessing ... 1124 This seems to mean that since I am not in the
next room and cannot know that there are fifty

people in it,

could not be making a statement, only a guess or conjecture.
C.

Austin, Howto Do Thinqs with Words, p. 144.
24

Ibid.,

p. 137.

I
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But I could be taken as obviously making a statement if I were
in the room. The situation
statement appropriately,

would lend itself

to making a

according · to Austin, if I am in a

position to know the facts that the utterance is about.

He seems

to be implying that statement making involves a very close acquaintance between the speaker and the facts that his statement
are about, i.e.,

that the speaker's situation

virtually

insures

that the statement is true.
Consider the insincereity
.2).

forms of infelicity

(

. 1 and

According to these, the statement 'It is raining'

certain other statements,

e.g.,

'The streets

are wet'.

former statement is to be happy, then the latter
be in accord with it.

The truth of the first

the truth of the second statement.
order for the first

If the

statement must

statement implies

The second has to be true in

utterance to have a claim-making force.

this begs the question since the truth of the first
at issue.

If I settle

implies

But

is the po1nt

the question of its truth in advance, then

I am forced to admit, if someone takes me outside and shows me
bone-dry streets,

that I failed to make a statement.

It seems to me that what I should admit to instead is that I
had made a false statement.

Surely the latter

makes more sense.

It makes more sense because the facts prove the statement was
false and not that the facts proved that the making of a statement
was not the proper thing to have done. The statement that was
uttered simply turned out to be false.

Wecan come to know that

a statement is true or false separately from knowing those facts
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that give the utterance a claim-making force.

Thus, I may look out

of a wet windowpaneand not know that someone just hosed it down.
'It is raining'

was apparently warranted, but I turned out to be

wrong. If .we are not careful about distinguishing

between those

facts and cjrcumstances which make a statement a .statement and those
facts and circumstances ~hich make it true or filse
pretation

then our inter-

of claim-making force would be full of difficulties.

Austin obviously believed that the truth/falsehood
assessment was applicable to statements.
of truth and falsity

dimension of

He believed that questions

depended on whether the statement ''corresponds

.ustin seemingly required too
to the facts. 1125 I al so implied that .A
close an acquaintance with the facts in order to make a statement.
Although I do not think Austin is overly clear about this matter,
my commentson this close acquaintance between the speaker and the
facts are obviously an over-statement of the problem. At one point,
Austin said that in making a statement "Facts come in as well as
our knov,ledge or opinion about facts. 1126 This implies that what we
believe or think as to what the facts are is important for deciding
whether a statement was the proper thing to have said.

Believing some-

thing is true will serve very well for making a statement, while the
facts themselves will determine whether the statement made is true
or false.

A happy act of stating does not require an infallible

knowledge of the facts.

If we treat stating as dependent on what we

believe to be true, then the usual sense of the term 'statement'
Ibid.,

p. 139.

Ibid.,

p. 141.

26--

is
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is retained,

i.e.,

a claim that is warranted by the circumstances.

What I have been attempting to do in the present discussion
is show that if one is not clear over howAustin treated the word
'statement,

1

certain confusions can arise.

went beyond the truth/falsehood
assessment of an utterance.

I discussed howAustin

dimension in giving a fuller

One must also be clear over the

different ways that a statement may be related to the facts by
distinguishing

such things as those facts that make it true and those

facts that give the utterance its claim-making force.

If they are

confused with one another, then confusions will arise.

With these

things in mind, I want to discuss, in the next chapter, exactly how
Austin would have understood the claim-making force of an utterance.
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CHAPTER5

Austin realized that being related to the facts is a complicated affair.

The facts make whatever was uttered an appro-

priate th t ng· to have_satd. Being true is only one way of determining that an utterance is the right or appropriate thing to say.
Austin said that 11we cannot quite make the simple statement that
the truth of statements depends on facts as distinct

from knowledge

of facts. 111 Our knowledge of the facts can change and may alter
what we previously said was the case.

Muchof what we say "depends

on knowledge at the time of utterance. 112 This knowledge may very
well be incomplete, obsolete,

or misinterpreted

so that any state-

ment based on this knowledge may be proven false when put to the
test.

The facts and what we know of the facts are two different

things.
Austin's emphasis on the importance of the speaker's knowledge
of the facts in making truth claims leaves open the possibility
statements being false.

of

The facts may seem to be such that the

statement the speaker makes is believed to be true.
examination it is seen to be false.

But on closer

Had he knownmore, the state-

ment would not have been made. A false statement was not the
appropriate thing to have said, although the speaker's knowledge
at the time suggested

Ibid. , p. 143.

2--

I bi d . , p . 143.

it was the right

thing to say.

From this,

it
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follows that he does not have to state the facts truly in order to
make a statement.

Other thin gs must also be in order for something

we say to be a statement.

What a speaker knows about the facts

give him reasons for making a state ment, while fitting
makes it true.

the facts

Together, they make the statement appropriate or

right under the circumstances.

But only the speaker's knowledge is

relevant to the question of his utterance having claim-making force.
If a speaker's statement cannot be said to be either true or
false,

it will be because the speaker's knowledge of the situation

and circumstances is not sufficient
The speaker cannot claim:

to decide one way or the other.

'There is no life on Mars as we know it,'

because the circumstances are not sufficiently
claim.

knownto make such a

Wehave never been there or been in any position to gather

any information about life on Mars, nor has the evidence gathered by
Mars probes been conclusive.

Any utterance about life on Mars will

be more of a guess than a statement of fact.

A speaker must have

enough knowledge of the facts which he believes his statement will
fit:

"The truth or falsity

of statements is affected by what they

leave out or put in and by their being misleading, and so on. 113
Whena speaker's utterances express a statement, it is false when it
inaccurately represents the facts and true if the statement represents them accurately.

It is happy if it is the appropriate thing

to say under the circumstances.
As stated before, I am only interested

in those utterances

which are seriously made. Lies, jokes, play~ metaphors, etc.,
Ibid. , p. 145 .

do
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not count as serious statements of fact.

They are important in the

sense that, for example, a person uttering a lie is saying something
that is parasitic

on a serious linguistic

exchange. If a liar could

not get his audience to believe that what he has uttered is serious
then his lie would not work on the audience. A lie can only be
successful if the audience believes the liar sincerely means what he
is saying.

I am interested in those utterances where the speaker

seriously believes that what he states is the case.

In such instances,

the speaker believes his advice is good, his promise will be kept, his
statement is true, and his order is meant to be obeyed. His audience
must believe that the speaker is sincere and intends these acts to
be taken seriously.

His advice may be bad or intended it to be

bad, his promise not to be kept, his statement a lie, his order
illegitimate;

but the speaker must give his audience reason to

believe that he can back them up. As attempts to deceive, lies
must get the audience to believe everything is in order or the liar's
deception will fail:

"A serious utterance does in our world entitle

the audience to infer that the speaker thinks that he, when asked to,
can back it up in a way appropriate to it. 114 Our utterances
have to be taken seriously or nobody would listen to us, as in
the story of the little

boy who creid "Wolf!" too manytimes.

Because we take an utterance seriously, we infer that the speaker
knows and believes certain facts:

A speaker who wants to affect

11

us~with what he says has therefore every reason to pose as having

Furberg, Saying and Meaning, p. 91.

92

these beliefs. 115
Just as a promise is still
a statement is still

a promise when given ~n bad faith,

a statement even when it is false.

In dis-

cussing claim-making force, the question that needs to be asked
is:

What is it that an utterance needs in order to have this claim-

making force, even--though· the statement itself

may be false?

Further,

what is it about saying 'It is raining outside'

that makes it a

statement as opposed to a guess or conjecture?

Although a statement

was not the appropriate thing to have said because it turned out to
be false,

it still

may have the force of making a claim.

act of stating in which I am interested

It is the

at the moment, i.e.,

the act

of making a claim.
For an utterance to have claim-making force, the utterer must
be making a truth-claim,
The utteran~

i.e.,

he must be attempting to state a fact.

must be asserting something about some actual or puta-

tive state of affairs.

Although statements may falsely assert some-

thing about some actual state of affairs,

the utterer must think his

claim is true if his utterance is to have claim-making force.

Al-

though he may not possess the correct knowledge, he must believe
that he does.

It is on this basis that he is making a truth-claim.

Statements, or truth-claims,
utterer

are attempts to state facts.

believes them to be true.

ments that they thought were false,
notion of serious lingustic
Ibid.,

p. 95.

The

If people regularly uttered state- •
then they would violate the

exchanges. Wewould not be communicating
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anything to each other, and this seems to violate the crucial
task of ·.language which is to communicate information.
is reasonable to conclude that when one utters

I think it

a statement, he be-

lieves that it is true and that he believes that he has the knowledge and evidence to substantiate
The possibility
left open.

the claim he is making.

of a statement being false must always be

Nevertheless,

the utterer

must at least believe he

has a credible knowledge foundation on which to base what he purports to be a truth-claim.

If we require that a speaker must

have first-hand,

evidence which indicates what claim he

infallible

should make, then his statement will always be true!

priori.

The

conditions for making a statement would then be such as to presuppose in advance the statement's

truth.

The utterer

only needs

to believe that he has the appropriate knowledge in order to make
a truth-claim.

This requires him to be prepared to back up his

claim if challenged and to be prepared to withdraw his claim if
it is shown to be false or inappropriate.
If one considers a scientist

working in a space program, such

a person must at least believe that the information
from the last satellite

obtained

to Mars was credible enough to make the

claim that 'There is no life on Mars.'

If he believed the claim

was true, then he would be prepared to show the evidence and infor- ·
mation on which he based the claim.

If he could not refer us to,

or produce, this evidence, then we would have no reason for taking
seriously what he says.

We should or woul d not accept what anyone

claims if we thought the person did not have good reasons for
making his claim.
Whenan utterance has the force of a claim, the people
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involved must have the appropriate intentions,
liefs.

attitudes

and be-

One must be able to infer that the speaker believes his

truth-claim

on the basis of his knowledge at the time of his

utterance.

Not only must he believe that what he is claiming

is true, based on his knowledge, but his audience must also believe that he has credible reasons for making the claim.

Other-

wise, the audience will have no reason to believe that his claim
is a serious one.
utterer

We prove that a claim ·isunhappy by showing the

that his putative knowledge, Which served as the reason

for his claim, was insufficient

for making the statement.

His

information was inadequate although he thought it was accurate.
For the purpose of deciding whether an utterer
truth-claim,

has made a

it is not necessary to decide in advance whether or

not the utterance fits

the facts.

not qualify as a truth-claim.
about the facts,

Since it does not make any claim

it is, therefore,

may be true or false.

A non-serious statement does

not the kind of thing which

It is not a statement at all because it is

not making a serious claim about the world.

A statement is the

kind of thing which may be erroneous, the kind of t hi ng which may
or may not turn out to be the case after the act of truth-claiming
is performed.
etc.,

Wenever say that lies,

jokes, plays, metaphors,

are erroneous, this is reserved for things which are said to

be the case but on further examination turn out not to be the
case:

11

It should be noted that a mistake will not in general make

an act void, though it may make it excusable. 116 We can show that
. Austin, How to Do Thinqs with Words, p. 42.
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an utterer's

claim is false by showing that his knowledge was

in some way in error without having to 1abel him a liar.
The point of all this is that for someone to utter something
with the force of making a claim we must be able to infer that he
believes it and is entitled

to believe it, on the basis of his

knowledge at the time of his uttering
actual or putative state of affairs
knowledge of the facts.

it.

A claim about some

in the world is based on my

This claim must be recognized as based on

adequate information to which the speaker has access.
must be in order for performing this particular
i.e.,

Everything

act of stating,

I must know certain things about certain states of affairs

which I have been in a good position to ascertain.
stances, objects,

individuals,

etc.,

The circum-

involved in my act of stating

must be appropriate for makinq this particular

statement.

this ~s considered in judging whether a particular
claim-making force.

These things are still

All of

speech act has

the basis of making

such a judgement even if the utterance is proven false.

Falsehood

canoot rob a statement of its claim-making force, thereby voiding
the act of stating.
The conditions for making a statement appropriately

are that

I believe that what I claim is so because my knowledge of the facts,
circumstances,

and my status justify

it is not justified

its being made. Showing that

means that it is inappropriately

made. Showing

that it does not fit the faets the way I though it did means it is
false.
Take two individuals,

one a world traveler

who spends much
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time flying from country to country and the other a hermit living
on an island in the Atlantic Ocean who happens to be a descendent
of a deserter from Christopher Columbus' fleet
the NewWorld. The latter
that the world is flat

deserted because he believed it was true

and that at any momentthe fleet would sail

over the edge of the world.
over the edge.

before it discovered

So, he jumped ship before it took him

As there were only primitive natives on the island

to which he swam, he was able to pass his belief,
world is flat,

ie.,

that the

as information without anyone proving it to be false.

His descendent is finally

found by civilization

and it is discovered

that the hermit believes the world is flat.
Both individuals
flat.

1

are heard by an audience to say, 'The world is

In the case of the world traveler,

making a joke or telling

we can only assume he is

a story to an audience or children.

would not take him as making a truth-claim.
knowledge of the facts would not justify
seriously.

His status,

audience is aware of this,
truth-claim.

status,

his making this statement

truth-claim,

would not be

and if the

they will infer that he is not making a

A joke, yes - a statement, no.

is making a truth-claim

We are aware that his

knowledge, circumstances, etc.,

appropriate for making this particular

We

They are doubting he

because the claim is false,

but because his

knowledge and other circumstances are inappropriate

for him

to make such a claim at all.
But the hermit who says the same sentence, i.e.,
flat',

represents

a different

that he is making a truth-claim

case altogether.

'The world is

He really believes

because his knowledge, circumstances,
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status,

et.c,

indicate that he really does believe it.

His

audi~nce on hearing this would not say he is spouting nonsense
or making a joke, but that he is making a statement.

Everything

about him, everything he knows at the time of his utterance is
appropriate for his believing that 'The world is flat'
The circumstances do make this an appropriate thing
to say.

is true.
for the speaker

The circumstances, knowledge, status of the speaker are

also appropriate for his audience to infer th at he is attempting
to make a state ment, although they know that his statement is
false.

The truth of :tiis statement is not considered in judging

that he was making a serious truth-claim.
falsity

It will take more than

to make this the wrong thing for the hermit to have said

under the circumstances.
be criticized,

The appropriateness of an utterance may

whether the statement is true or false;

for example, descriptions,

which are said to be true or false or,

if you like, are 'statements,'
since they are selective
tobe ~aright

"Thus,

are surely liable to these criticisms,

and uttered for a purpose. 117 For a statement

and proper thing to have said will depend on something

more than whether it fits

the facts truly or falsely.

Take another example. A parrot on one occasion, and I on
another, both utter the sounds, 'It is raining outside.'

I utter

this sentence to give a piece of information to someone. I say it
and my audience takes it as a statement because they decide that I
believe it is true on the basis of the knowledge and evidence I
Ibid. , p. 144.
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have. Let us say that my knowledge is based on the fact that when

I cane in from outdoors, it was raining and, further,

that people

around me said the same thing for the same reasons.

But the

person I talked to goes outside and then returns · saying I and
the others were wrong, that it is not raining _outside, and that my
statement is false.
utterance justified
justifiable

Myknowledge of the facts at the time of my
the utterance.

On the knowledge I had, it was

for me to believe that I was making a truth-claim.

though it turned out later to be false,
a statement at the time I uttered it.
facts,

etc.,

it still

Al-

had the force of

The circumstances, my status,

were adequate enough for me to utter this sentence

with a claim-making force and for my audience to infer that I had
good reasons for saying what I did, even if I turned out later to
be wrong.
Take the parrot who utters the same sounds, 'It is raining
when it is, in fact, raining as the parrot utters the

outside,'

sounds. Are we to say that his utterance is the making of a truthclaim? No. He would not be "Saying11 anything true because what
he utters

is not a sentence used in making a statement, and does not,

therefore,

have a claim-making force.

The parrot does not possess

knowledge of the facts and other evidences which he believes will
justify

his utterance as the making of a truth-claim.

His audience

will not infer he is doing this when he utters the sounds, so they
will not consider him to be making a statement which happens to be
true.
parrot's

1--

It is not a statement because the circumstances, i.e.,
status,

how knowledge of the facts,

etc.,

the

do not justify
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judging the parrot's

utterance to be the making of a statement.

It

is more than words being related to the world in a certain way that
qualifies

an utterance as an act of stating.

There are other things

necessary for the emitting of certain sounds to constitute

the making

of a claim, things which the parrot could never satisfy.
Going back to the second and third chapters for a moment, I
would like to say that the claim-making force is not a matter of
the locutionary side of the utterance.

I think believing that the

force of an utterance can be-elucidated

in terms of the dictionary

meaning of the utterance is a mistaken notion and I have already
argued against this doctrine.

What I want to do now is bring it up

again and see how my previous discussions bear on what I have been
saying about the claim-making force of a statement.
If someone says 'John went to the bank,' I may be in doubt as
to what this means.
might askethe speaker.

'\4hat kind of bank are you talking about?

1

I

The speaker might then inform me that it is

the river bank to which he is referring.
National Bank. By simply elucidating

He did not mean the First

what the words used mean, with

regard to the world, the speaker has been able to clear up the
ambiguity of part of the sentence's

meaning, i.e.,

whether John went

to the river bank or to ~the First National Bank.
But suppose that I am a burglar and I want to break into
John's house and rob him.

I want to be positive that he is not at

home so I can commit my crime.

Even though the meaning of the words

has been cleared up, could I not still

wonder whether the speaker

"meant it as a piece of information or as a guess ... 118
Furberg, Sayinq and Meanino, p. 208.

100

It may very well be unclear as to whether or not the speaker really
believes or would have any good reason to believe that John went to
the river bank to fish.

I could still

be in doubt as to the

utterance the speaker made. It was already determined by me that the
speaker meant that John went to the river bank and not the First
National Bank. What I have to determine now is whether the ·speaker
believes he is making a truth-claim or merely guessing.

If it is a

guess, then I have no good reason to assume that it is a fact that
John is downby the river bank; however if l thought the speaker was
making a truth-claim,
John is.

I would have a better reason to assume where

If I am to rob John, I must be assured that he is not home

and will not be for a while.
So, in addition to clearing up the meaning of the speaker's
utterance,

I must now clear up its force.

Is he making a truth-

claim or a mere guess7 I will have to examine the speaker's status,
the circumstances of his utterance,

his evidence or lack of evidence

to see whetherthe reasons the speaker has for making the utterance
would justify

his making a truth-claim _or a guess.

Clearing up the

meaning gave us no reason to believe one as opposed to another.

By

examining these things, I may find out that John actually told him
where he was going and the he even saw John take a fishing pole.
can then infer that the speaker was making a truth-claim.
speaker's status,

situation,

The

knowledge, and evidence is such tn 9t

he has a credible reason for believing that he is making a truthclaim, i.e.,

that he is stating a fact.

If he does not have good

reasons for believing his cl ai n is true, I can assume that he is

I
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only 9uessing and that John might very well be at home.
Even if I can infer that he is making a truth-claim,
might still
fishing,

be at hime.

If John changed his mind about going ·

his statement would be false.

is making a truth-claim,

John

By establishing

that he

I am assuming there is enough credible

evidence for believing that it is a fact that John is at the
river bank fishing.

On this basis,

I can assume that John is out,

but, of course, I might be unpleasantly surprised to find him in.
This entire discussion is independent of knowing precisely
what the words uttered mean. As a matter of fact,

the speaker could

make it clear that he is stating a fact without knowing which bank
John went to.

John may have said to the speaker,

1

bank,• so that when he says 'John went to the bank,

1 am going to the
1

he has what he

considered good evidence for believing that his utterance is a truthclaim.

Yet, I may be in doubt as to which bank he went to.

As a

burglar who wants to rob him, I hope it is true that he went to the
river bank and not true that he went to the First National Bank from
which he may return shortly.

We ~now a statement has been made, but

I am in doubt as to part of its meaning. The meaning of the utterance
left me in doubt as ~to what would make it true, despite the fact that
the ~peaker s status,
1

for making a statement.
statement true.

circumstances, etc.,

are seemingly appropriate

John's going to either bank would make his

Knowingthat he did not go to either,

he went to

the bakery or the post office instead, would make it false.
I think by now it is clear what Austin would have said about the
force of a statement, or what I have called a claim-making force,
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had he done so.

It is those things in a total speech situation

that give us reasons for thinking that the utterance is an attempt
to state a fact.

These other ele ments have to warrant our assuming

that t he ,utterance is the making of a claim.

This is why the

utterance is asses sed Jt her than by its being true or false.
and falsity

Truth

have no special place in assessing whether a statement

is being made. Because of this Austin went past truth and falsity
to a dimension of assessment concerned with whether what was said is
the proper thin g to have uttered.
In discussing claim-making force, I have been looking into those
aspects of assessing a statement that are distinct
deal with truth and falsity.
status,

from those which

These have to do with the speaker's

knowledge at the time of the utterance, circumstances, etc.,

by which we could infer that he would be making a truth-claim.

If a

statement is found to be false, then we have reason to believe this
was the wrong thing to have said.

But this is not the only way that

we can show that an utterance was not the proper thing for a speaker
to have said.

The speaker's status,

and his knowledgeof the facts

might also give us reason for inferring that the speaker is or is
not justified

in making a truth-claim.

We may conclude that the

speaker does not have adequate evidence for b~lieving that 'p' is
true so he could not justifiably

have been making a truth-claim.
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Cencluding Remarks

Austin, in dealing with statements, has tried to elucidate
the total speech act in the total
texts,

speech-situation.

In other con-

the dominant theme with regard to statements has been to spe-

cify when they are true or what 'truth'
Austin-Strawson debate on truth.

is, as was done in the

Some discussions have gone a little

further,

i.e.,

the Cartwright and Strawson articles

earlier,

and have sought to say what a statement is not.

aim was to go beyond this and investigate
act which make it the particular

mentioned
Austin's

those aspects of a speech

type of act that it is.

What is it

about an utterance which makes it a statement, warning, order, question,
request, etc.

What I have been attempting to do is make explicit

what

it is about an utterance that makes it the expression of a statement.
Hopefully, what I have said would be similar to what Austin would have
said about assessing the claim-making force of statements,

had he done

so.

I have already argued against thinking we can reveal what makes
an utterance a particular
utterance's
particular

type of discourse by investigating

the

meaning. Austin believed that what makes an utterance a
type is how it is related to the world, i.e.,

speech situation,

the total

etc~ This is precisely what he did in Howto Do

Thinas with Words, but he neglected to discuss what it is about a
statement that makes it a statement.
statement true;

facts,

Facts, in one sense, make a

in another sense, make an utterance the
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expression of a statement.

Wemay appraise a statement not only

on how it corresoonds to the facts in the first
ther or not the facts in the second sense justify
appropriate thing to say in a given situation.

sense, but also whea statement as the
Both forms of

assessment represent a general dimension of appraising a statement.
But these two types of appraisal should be distinguished.

I have

already examined what happens when we fail to do this in my critique
of the Olsen article.
Appropriateness has to do with the making of a statement while
both truth and appropriateness
The result

have to do with the statement made.

is a broader view of the assessment of statements.

We

can say more about 'The cat is on the mat' than that it is being
used to say something is true or false.

Wemust also be able to

determine that there are certain reasons, evidence, circumstances,
etc.,

which obtain to justify

we cannot do this,
is justified

the utterance as a truth-claim.

If

then we have no reason to think that the speaker

in making a truth-claim.

For instance,

if I know that

the speaker just came from outside, and that he owns a cat, then I
have good reason to assume that he is making a truth-claim.
trariwise,

Con-

if I know that the speaker has been.out all day, then I

can assume he is speculating or guessing.

In the latter

case, he

does not seem to be in a position where he could have sufficient
credible evidence for believing that 'The cat is on the mat' is true.
In Austin's discussion of the illocutionary

force of statements,

he has presented more elements than we usually consider in assessing
statements.

Although it goes beyond the scope of this paper, and
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despite the fact that I am somewhat inclined to discuss it, there
are other things about statements that I find interesting
discussion.

For instance,

any illocutionary
truth or falsity

in Austin's

there is his point that the success of

act, and not just statements, will involve the
of some statement.

This suggests that statements

have a special place in performing various types of speech acts.
Statements seem to represent a basic building block, or must be
presupposed, in performing other types of speech acts.

It seems to

represent that aspect of an utterance that we want to be assumed,
if not believed.
constative

In this case, it would be interesting

aspect of various illocutionary

to take this

acts and examine it to

see how claim-making is at least an implicit part of all speech acts.
P.F. Strawson implies this when he says that in a performative "a
proposition
stative).119

is expressed, though not 'constated'
I think the notion of a 'proposition'

(issued as a conas an ideal enti-

ty would be unacceptable to Austin, but the quote nonetheless gets
the point across that a claim can be expressed in an utterance which
has a force other than that of claim-making.
then, to distinguish

the different

It would be interesting,

forces found in various utterances

and see how they are related.
Another point of interest
is also suggested by Austin.

that I would like to discuss at l ength
The point behind Howto Do Things with

Words was to show that to say something is also to do something.
Austin showed that by saying something we could perform acts of
9

Strawson, Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning' p. 63.
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warning, promisinq, stating,
teresting

requesting,

etc.,

to note that by performing these acts we may perform

other acts that could not be made explicit
are being performed.
etc.,

but it is also in-

but which nonetheless

By performing an act of stating,

I may also be insulting,

sarcastic,

warning,

rude, condescending, etc.

Wemay also use these words to describe someone's utterance but we
could not say 'I insult you, 1 or 'I condescend to you. 1

This would

be nonsense.

acts,

Yet, we still

perform these perlocutionary

· it would seem they are dependent on these other acts.

so

Those cir-

cumstances that make an utterance a certain type of act might also
have a direct bearing on these other acts.
'Be careful crossing the street•

WhenI say to a child,

as a warning, this seems to be an

appropriate thing to say.

But if I say the same thing to a grown

man, so as to be sarcastic

or insulting,

is precisely

it almost seems that it

because this act of warning was not the appropriate

thing to say that it makes the insult successful.
failure

of an illocutionary

An intended

act might very well bring about the

success of another type of speech act.
The importance of Austin's work is that it points out the
complexity of ordinary languqge.
richness,

especially

One should not underestimate its

in making judgements about speech acts.

If

there is one thing Austin does, it is to reveal the many problems
that arise if we underestimate language.
complicated structures
Austin exercises,

Language and speech are

the study of which, if done with the care

can aid in the solving of problems and the

avoiding of philosophical mistakes.
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